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IT TAKES TWO TO TANGO: RETHINKING
NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY FOR THE SEXUAL
TRANSMISSION OF AIDS
William Sundbeckt
I. INTRODUCTION
SINCE THE FIRST CASES OF acquired immune deficiency
syndrome (AIDS) were reported in Los Angeles in 1981,
AIDS has evolved into a serious public health risk." While the
disease was originally considered confined to narrow popula-
tions of homosexuals and intravenous (IV) drug users, AIDS is
currently spreading more rapidly among heterosexuals than
any other group.' As the AIDS epidemic grows, legislative and
judicial responses are becoming more frequent.- In the face of
the growing AIDS epidemic, many commentators have antici-
pated the availability of a negligence action for those who con-
tract AIDS through sexual contact with infected partners."
t B.A., University of California at Berkeley; J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, 1995. The author would like to thank the following people for
their comments and encouragement: Cynthia Sundbeck, Professor Maxwell J. Mehlman,
and Malin Dollinger, M.D. The opinions expressed in this Note are solely those of the
author.
1. See Susan Y. Chu et al., Epidemiology of HIV in the United States, in AIDS:
ETIOLOGY, DIAGNOSIs, TREATMENT, AND PREVENTION 99 (Vincent T. Devita et al. eds., 3d
ed., 1992) (discussing the nature and scope of the AIDS epidemic since AIDS was first
identified).
2. Thomas R. O'Brien et al., Acquisition and Transmission of HI, in THE MEDI-
CAL MANAGEMENT OF AIDS 3, 4-5 (Merle A. Sande & Paul A. Volberding eds., 3d ed.,
1992) (explaining that while heterosexual transmission is still a small percentage of AIDS
cases, it is the class growing most rapidly).
3. See generally Roger N. Braden, AIDS: Dealing with the Plague, 19 N. KY. L.
REv. 277, 281-83 (1992) (providing an example of the broad range of legislative responses
to AIDS in Kentucky and Ohio); Stewart F. Hancock, Jr., AIDS and the Law, N.Y. ST.
B.J., Feb. 1993, at 8, 8 (discussing the flood of AIDS cases reaching the courts).
4. See, e.g., Regina DelaRosa, Viability of Negligence Actions for Sexual Transmis-
sion of the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Virus, 17 CAP. U.L. REv. 101, 101
(1987) (proposing that precedents exist to state a cause of action in negligence for the
397
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These commentators suggest that a negligence action for the
sexual transmission of AIDS can be modeled after negligence
actions for the sexual transmission of venereal diseases and
genital herpes.5 Particularly, some commentators conclude that
because of the substantial public policy interest in stopping the
spread of sexually transmitted diseases, courts should reject
contributory and comparative negligence and assumption of the
risk as defenses, leaving the defendant to bear the entire duty
of care.6
This Note rejects this conclusion and proposes that the
courts recognize the defenses of contributory and comparative
negligence in AIDS transmission cases. Part II of this Note
provides a general overview of the nature of AIDS and the
scope of the AIDS crisis. Part III outlines the case law involv-
ing the negligent transmission of venereal diseases, emphasiz-
ing the tendency to place the entire duty of care on defendants.
sexual transmission of AIDS); Bonnie E. Elber, Negligence as a Cause of Action for Sex-
ual Transmission of AIDS, 19 U. TOL. L. REv. 923, 924 (1988) (predicting that an indi-
vidual who is infected with HIV through sexual contact should be able to state a cause of
action based on a negligence theory); Robin S. Fredrickson, Tort Liability for AIDS, 24
Hous. L. REv. 954, 975 (1987) (suggesting that because of the seriousness of AIDS and
the likelihood that it will continue to spread, the courts should impose a duty to avoid the
sexual transmission of AIDS); Stephen A. Skiver & James A. Hickey, AIDS: Legal Issues
1992, 19 Omo N.U. L. REv. 839, 869-70 (1993) (arguing that if a plaintiff is able to
establish causation in AIDS cases, the plaintiff should be able to recover based on a negli-
gence theory); Jeanmarie Papelian, Note, Assessing Liability for Negligent Transmission
of AIDS, 24 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 649, 677 (1990) (observing that the courts appear poised
to recognize a negligence cause of action for the sexual transmission of AIDS).
5. See, e.g., DelaRosa, supra note 4, at 105 (suggesting that courts may find a duty
not to transmit AIDS based on precedent from other sexual disease cases); Elber, supra
note 4, at 923-24 (observing that case law for the negligent transmission of AIDS will
likely be influenced by cases involving Herpes Simplex II (genital herpes) because it most
closely resembles AIDS); Linda K. Burdt & Robert S. Caldwell, Note, The Real Fatal
Attraction: Civil and Criminal Liability for the Sexual Transmission of AIDS, 37 DRAKE
L. Rav. 657, 664 (1987-88) (stating that the basis for a negligence action for the sexual
transmission of AIDS is analogous to the basis for liability involving other sexual diseases);
Deane Kenworthy Corliss, Comment, AIDS-Liability for Negligent Sexual Transmis-
sion, 18 CuMa. L. REv. 691, 709 (1988) (stating that venereal disease cases have developed
the liability rules upon which negligence liability for the sexual transmission of AIDS will
be based); Papelian, supra note 4, at 677 (concluding that based on principles announced
in cases involving venereal diseases, courts appear ready to recognize a negligence cause of
action for the sexual transmission of AIDS).
6. See DelaRosa, supra note 4, at 114 (concluding that it is crucial to the well-being
of society that courts impose a duty on persons not to transmit HIV); Elber, supra note 4,
at 941-44 (discussing possible defenses in AIDS transmission cases and concluding that
public policy does not favor their use); Papelian, supra note 4, at 662 (concluding that the
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk have not fared well in cases
of sexually transmitted diseases).
IT TAKES TWO TO TANGO
Part III evaluates the attempts to analogize venereal disease
cases to AIDS cases and considers this analogy in light of the
traditional goals of the tort system. Part IV examines the scope
of a would-be defendant's duty to avoid transmitting AIDS.
This Note's proposal is intended to discourage suits where
plaintiffs have not made reasonable attempts to ascertain the
risk of contracting AIDS from potential partners. This proposal
is also intended to encourage full disclosure of potential risks,
reduce the incidence of AIDS, and prevent the social costs of
AIDS from being shifted to the general public.
II. THE NATURE OF THE AIDS CRISIS
A. The Progression of AIDS
AIDS is caused by a retrovirus named human immu-
nodeficiency virus (HIV).7  The virus especially impacts T-
helper lymphocyte cells." Since T-helper lymphocyte cells coor-
dinate a number of critical functions of the immune system,
damage to the cells leads to the deterioration of the body's im-
mune functions.9
The course and manifestations of HIV infection can vary
substantially,' 0 but several stages are common.1 During the
early weeks following infection, there is sometimes the occur-
rence of mononucleosis-like symptoms, such as fever, malaise,
7. Centers for Disease Control, 1993 Classification System for HIV Infection and
Expanded Surveillance Case Definition for AIDS Among Adolescents and Adults, 41
MORBIDIr AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 1 (Dec. 18, 1992) [hereinafter Centers for
Disease Control, 1993 Classification System].
8. See ADRIAN Moss, HIV AND AIDS MANAGEMENT BY THE PRIMARY CARE
TEAM 10-11 (1992) (stating that HIV has "a particular affinity for human T-helper lym-
phocyte, although it may infect other cells"). Once the virus invades the T-helper lympho-
cyte cells, it may replicate and eventually severely damage the cell's immune function. Id.
at 11.
9. See Centers for Disease Control, 1993 Classification System, supra note 7, at 1
(stating that T-helper lymphocytes coordinate significant immunologic functions without
which there is a progressive impairment of the immune system).
10. Id. (explaining that "studies of the natural history of HIV infection have mani-
fested a wide spectrum of disease manifestations ranging from asymptomatic infection to
life-threatening characterized by opportunistic infections and cancers").
11. See generally MERCK RESEARCH LABORATORIES, THE MERCK MANUAL OF DI-
AGNOSIS AND THERAPY 80-82 (Robert Berkow et al. eds., 16th ed., 1992) (identifying some
of the stages experienced by AIDS patients: (1) antibody negative asymptomatic carrier
stage, (2) acute mononucleosis-like syndrome stage, (3) antibody positive asymptomatic
carrier stage, (4) AIDS-related complex (ARC) stage, and (5) full blown AIDS character-
ized by life-threatening characteristic infections or certain forms of cancer).
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rash, and generalized enlargement of the lymph nodes.12 Fol-
lowing this initial stage of acute symptoms, HIV lies dormant,
and the carrier is asymptomatic.'8 This stage is often followed
by the AIDS-related complex (ARC) stage in which the indi-
vidual experiences several symptoms closely associated with
AIDS including weight loss, fever, malaise, fatigue, chronic di-
arrhea, and anemia. 14 Once the immune system has been suffi-
ciently depleted, the patient is classified as having AIDS and
becomes susceptible to opportunistic infections or secondary
cancers.15
Despite significant advances in treating the opportunistic
infections caused by AIDS, over 95 % of AIDS patients die
from these opportunistic infections.' 6 An individual who is in-
fected with HIV may remain infected and able to transmit the
virus during his entire life17 although rare exceptions have been
reported.' 8
12. See id. at 80 (reporting that this stage is seen in a minority of patients between
two and four weeks after infection). Seroconversion for AIDS antibodies usually occurs one
to three months later. Id.
13. See generally SCENARIO COMMITTEE ON AIDS, STEERING COMMITTEE ON FU-
TURE HEALTH SCENARIOS AIDS UP TO THE YEAR 2000, at 3 (1992) [hereinafter SCENA-
RIO COMMITTEE] (observing that the asymptomatic stage lasts a substantial period of
time).
14. See MERCK RESEARCH LABORATORIES, supra note 11, at 80-81 (defining ARC
as a pattern of chronic symptoms occurring in those who are HIV-positive but do not have
the listed clinical conditions that define AIDS). The ARC stage does not occur in all AIDS
patients. See id. at 81. It should be noted that the term ARC has recently fallen out of use
among some in the medical community. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, THE CDC's CASE DEFINITION OF AIDS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED RE-
VISIONS-BACKGROUND PAPER 50 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Aug. 1992) [herein-
after OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT] (noting that the medical community used the
term ARC to describe those patients who manifested symptoms that commonly occurred in
AIDS patients but did not meet one of the 23 clinical conditions originally used by the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to define AIDS). Since the CDC's definition of AIDS
has now been expanded to include those whose T-helper lymphocyte count has fallen below
a baseline level, many of those who were originally diagnosed as having ARC may now be
classified as having AIDS. See id.; see also Centers for Disease Control, 1993 Classifica-
tion System, supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the CDC's 1993 expansion of
the AIDS definition and the accompanying increase in reported cases).
15. See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 14, at 49 (noting
that the primary effect of AIDS is an "acquired, persistent and profound functional depres-
sion in cell-mediated immunity" leading to infections and cancers that do not ordinarily
occur in persons with normal immunity).
16. MERCK RESEARCH LABORATORIES, supra note 15, at 83. While opportunistic in-
fections still cause the death of many AIDS patients, recent advances in managing oppor-
tunistic infections have led to reductions in their incidence, morbidity, and mortality. Id.
17. Moss, supra note 8, at 11.
18. Id.
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B. The Prevalence of AIDS
The AIDS epidemic has had a profound effect on Ameri-
can society, invoking comparisons to the Black Plague that rav-
aged Europe between 1348 and 1350."9 In 1991, approximately
58,000 new AIDS cases were reported by the Centers for Dis-
ease Control (CDC), 20 raising the total number of reported
AIDS cases to 206,392.21 Of the total reported cases, over
133,233 deaths had been reported by the end of 1991.2 Ini-
tially, the CDC predicted that between 50,000 and 60,000 new
cases would be reported annually from 1992 to 1994;23 how-
ever, in 1993, the CDC expanded its definition of AIDS, 4
causing the number of reported AIDS cases to increase by
204% from the number reported in 1991.25 Thus, by the thirti-
eth week of 1993, over 67,732 new AIDS cases had already
been reported. 28 The CDC predicted that the drastic increase
in 1993 would level off because it largely reflected cases which
19. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF AIDS IN THE UNITED
STATES 5 (1993) (stating that while AIDS has invoked comparisons with many plagues of
the past, the AIDS epidemic has most commonly been compared to the bubonic plague
(Black Death)).
20. Centers for Disease Control, Projections of the Number of Persons Diagnosed
with AIDS and the Number of Immunosuppressed HIV-Infected Persons - United
States, 1992-1994, 41 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 17, 18 (Jan. 15, 1993)
[hereinafter Centers for Disease Control, Projections] (reporting that during 1991, approx-
imately 58,000 persons in the United States had AIDS as defined by the 1987 surveillance
criteria).
21. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 18, at 1.
22. Id.
23. Centers for Disease Control, Projections, supra note 19.
24. Centers for Disease Control, 1993 Classification System, supra note 7, at 4 (ex-
panding AIDS surveillance case definition to include all HIV-infected persons with a T-
helper cell count below 200). Under the CDC's original definition, published in 1987, an
individual was classified as having AIDS if he manifested one of 23 clinical conditions. See
id. at 16-17 (listing the 23 clinical conditions which constituted a definitive diagnosis of
AIDS under the 1986 system). The expanded definition was intended to reflect the clinical
importance of T-helper lymphocyte cells in AIDS diagnosis. Id. at 1. The 1993 classifica-
tion system includes anyone with a T-helper lymphocyte count below a base level or with
one of 26 clinical conditions as having AIDS. Id.
25. See Centers for Disease Control, Impact of the Expanded AIDS Surveillance
Case Definition on AIDS Case Reporting-United States, First Quarter, 1993, 42 MOR-
BIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 308, 308 (Apr. 30, 1993) [hereinafter Centers for
Disease Control, Impact of Expanded AIDS Definition].
26. See Centers for Disease Control, Update: Barrier Protection Against HIV Infec-
tion on Other Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 42 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 589, 593 (Aug. 6, 1993) (summarizing the total number of reported AIDS cases
through July 31, 1993).
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had accumulated before 1993 but did not fall within the old
classification scheme.2 7
Even more significantly, 1 to 1.5 million people are in-
fected with HIV, the virus that causes AIDS,28 even though the
infection may be completely latent.29 The danger of those who
are asymptomatic and seropositive inadvertently transmitting
the disease is increased because most Americans do not believe
that their risk of contracting the virus is significant."0
The prevalence of AIDS threatens to seriously tax the
public health care system.8 1 Although the original estimates of
the average expenditure per AIDS patient were grossly overes-
timated, the costs remain substantial. 2 Moreover, there is an
increasing risk that AIDS patients will be screened out of the
private insurance market,33 thereby shifting the burden of fi-
nancing the AIDS crisis to the public sector. AIDS already
27. Centers for Disease Control, Impact of Expanded AIDS Definition, supra note
25, at 309-10.
28. Hancock, supra note 3, at 8.
29. See MERCK RESEARCH LABORATORIES, supra note 11, at 80 (describing the
asymptomatic seropositive stage of AIDS manifested in many individuals infected with
HIV).
30. Thomas A. Peterson et al., Prevention of the Sexual Transmission of HIV, in
AIDS: ETIOLOGY, DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT AND PREVENTION 443, 443 (Vincent Devita et
al. eds., 3d ed., 1992) (reporting that "over 95% of Americans feel they are at little or no
risk of developing AIDS").
31. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 11 (noting that the AIDS
crisis has sent over 200,000 people into the health care system and may send one million
more people who are disproportionately dependent on public funds).
32. See id. at 68-69 (observing that while the earliest estimates predicted that the
cost for AIDS patients would be $147,000 per patient from diagnosis to death, most esti-
mates are now between $40,000 and $50,000). Other sources estimate the costs as having a
much greater range. See Daniel Shacknai, Wealth = Health: The Public Financing of
AIDS Care, in AIDS AGENDA EMERGING ISSUES IN CIVIL RIGHTS, 181, 198 n.5 (Nan D.
Hunter & William B. Rubenstein eds., 1992) (noting that the average lifetime cost of
AIDS is between $53,000 and $100,580). It also has been argued that the total lifetime
costs of AIDS is less than the costs for some cancers. See Mark H. Jackson, Health Insur-
ance: The Battle over Limits on Coverage, in AIDS AGENDA EMERGING ISSUES IN CIVIL
RIGHTS, 147, 171 n.12 (Nan D. Hunter & William B. Rubenstein eds., 1992) (discussing
the trend among insurance companies to exclude AIDS patients). This comparison has an
obvious flaw. The risk of contracting AIDS is much more significantly linked to behavior.
While a person can reduce the risk of some cancers through lifestyle changes, the person
may still be at a significant risk because of a genetic predisposition. On the other hand, a
person can almost completely eliminate the risk of contracting AIDS by avoiding risky
conduct. Thus, the high costs associated with AIDS may be more disconcerting since the
costs could be practically eliminated through behavior modification.
33. See Jackson, supra note 32, at 147; Nicholas A. Papa, Comment, Testing the
Insurance Industry's Response to the AIDS Epidemic, 18 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 687, 692
(1992) (reporting the results of a recent study by the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment showing that 86% of private insurers will screen applicants for AIDS). Call-
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poses a significant drain on public funds.34 This drain is likely
to grow substantially since the 1 to 1.5 million individuals in-
fected with HIV are disproportionately from the pool of unin-
sured or underinsured. 5 AIDS is also increasingly a disease of
the poor.3 6 This result is hardly surprising since the debilitating
effects of AIDS eventually make AIDS patients unable to con-
tinue working.3 7
C. The Means of Transmission
The primary means of transmitting HIV include the fol-
lowing: (1) sexual contact; (2) transfusion of blood or blood
products; (3) the sharing of IV drug needles; and (4) perinatal
transmission.38 Several factors affect the probability of trans-
mitting HIV including the degree of infectivity (believed to be
highest immediately after exposure to HIV or the development
of full-blown AIDS) and the degree of exposure.3 " Contact
with bodily fluid is necessary to transmit the virus; HIV cannot
be transmitted through casual contact.40 While the virus theo-
retically could be transmitted by shared razors or toothbrushes,
fornia is the only state that prohibits insurers from screening for AIDS. See Jackson, supra
note 32, at 169.
34. Shacknai, supra note 32, at 183 (citing estimates that in 1992, 28.5% of the
public health costs associated with AIDS would be paid for by public funds). See also id.
at 181 (noting that 25% of AIDS costs are paid by Medicaid compared with 11% of
health care costs generally).
35. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 17 (observing that AIDS
victims are frequently uninsured or have exhausted their insurance because of policy exclu-
sions or job loss). See also Jackson, supra note 32, at 147-55 (discussing the increasing
trend among the health insurance industry to use policy exclusions and caps to shift the
burden of financing AIDS to the public sector). Moreover, some have suggested raising
insurance premiums to cope with the AIDS crisis. See Papa, supra note 33, at 699 (analyz-
ing possible insurance industry responses to the AIDS epidemic). This response might sig-
nificantly increase the number of those who are uninsured or underinsured.
36. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 69 (noting that because
AIDS is increasingly prevalent among low socio-economic groups, a large share of the costs
is borne by Medicaid).
37. See Jackson, supra note 32, at 148 (observing that AIDS patients eventually
become so ill that they are forced to terminate their employment and lose their job-related
insurance benefits). The serious ramifications of this result become evident when one con-
siders that almost two-thirds of the population are insured solely through employment-
related policies. Id. at 169, n.l.
38. See SCENARIO COMMITTEE, supra note 13 (describing the documented means
through which HIV has been transmitted).
39. See Moss, supra note 8, at 17 (listing these factors among numerous others af-
fecting the likelihood that one exposed to HIV will contract the disease).
40. See MERCK RESEARCH LABORATORIES, supra note 11, at 78 (noting that casual
contact will not transmit HIV because transmission requires contact with bodily fluids con-
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no cases have been reported of transmission by these means; 41
and there have been no reported cases of HIV transmission
from contact with saliva as a result of coughing or sneezing.' 2
Since even intimate contact without the exchange of bodily
fluidS4' cannot transmit the virus, there is no risk of infection
from casual contact like hugging or touching."
D. Incubation Period
A 1989 report of the CDC found that 95 % of those ex-
posed to HIV "seroconvert" (develop HIV antibodies) within
six months after the exposure.' 5 In rare cases, seroconversion
may take more than one year.' 6 While there is no test for
AIDS, the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and
the Western blot test can be used to test for HIV.47 Although
the period of time from HIV infection to full-blown AIDS can
taining infected cells or plasma). The bodily fluids capable of transmitting HIV are the
following: (1) blood, (2) semen, (3) vaginal secretions, (4) breast milk, and (5) saliva. Id.
41. See Moss, supra note 8, at 19-20 (noting that while in theory the virus may be
transmitted this way, no evidence has demonstrated that the virus actually is transmitted in
this manner, and normal hygiene would discourage most people from sharing razors and
toothbrushes).
42. MERCK RESEARCH LABORATORIES, supra note 11, at 78.
43. This fact has lead to the recommendation that condoms be used as a barrier to
HIV transmission. See Peterson et al., supra note 30, at 446 (reporting that studies have
shown that HIV will not pass through an intact latex condom). Although the use of latex
condoms is an effective barrier to the risk of transmitting HIV, condoms do not eliminate
all of the risks of contracting HIV because condoms may be defective or misused. See id.
(suggesting that the reasons latex condoms may not be 100% effective in preventing the
spread of HIV include: (1) the tendency of condoms to slip off; (2) the inability of condoms
to cover all parts of the penis; and (3) the wide misuse of condoms). The failure rate for
condoms is estimated at 2% when used consistently; however, a more typical failure rate is
12% because couples use condoms inconsistently. See id. (stating condoms fail in prevent-
ing pregnancy in 12 out of 100 couples during the course of a year because most couples
who rely on condoms occasionally engage in sexual relations without them).
44. See id. (noting that AIDS cannot be transmitted through even intimate nonsex-
ual contact because transmission requires contact with a bodily fluid).
45. Stephanie B. Goldberg, AIDS Phobia, A.B.A. J., June 1992, at 88, 88 (providing
a general overview of the public policy and legal issues related to AIDS).
46. See id. (noting that the CDC has stated that it is "extremely unlikely" that a
person who has not seroconverted after a year will later seroconvert).
47. See Michael S. Saag, AIDS Testing Now and in the Future, in THE MEDICAL
MANAGEMENT OF AIDS, 33, 33 (Merle A. Sande & Paul A. Volberding eds., 3d ed., 1992)
(explaining that although there is no test for "AIDS per se," there are antibody tests that
can detect HIV infection when an individual has developed HIV antibodies and no cross
reacting antibodies are present).
[Vol. 5:397
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vary substantially,48 research has shown that 54 % of those in-
fected with HIV progress to full blown AIDS within eleven
years. 49 Additionally, the average time between infection with
HIV and the development of full-blown AIDS is between 7.8
and 8.2 years.50
E. High-Risk Groups
When AIDS was first discovered, it was thought to be con-
fined to certain demographic groups commonly referred to as
"high-risk groups." 51 These groups included homosexual or bi-
sexual men and IV drug users.52 However, while unprotected
homosexual and bisexual activity and IV drug use remain
risky, the risk of contracting HIV results from unsafe practices,
not membership in a particular demographic group. 3 Further,
the notion of high-risk groups may encourage unsafe practices
because persons outside these groups may underestimate the
degree of risk associated with their behavior. 54 As groups not
traditionally associated with AIDS (i.e., heterosexuals, women,
and children) have contracted the disease with increasing fre-
48. See generally Moss, supra note 8, at 11 (reporting the results of a major study
indicating that 19% of those infected had not become symptomatic even after 8 to 12
years).
49. See SCENARIO COMMITTEE, supra note 13, at 3-4 (citing a study among gay men
in the United States).
50. See generally Joel B. Korin et al., Civil Liability for the Transmission of AIDS,
N.J. LAw., Jan./Feb. 1989, at 40, 43 (observing that the CDC has found that the average
time between exposure to HIV and development of full-blown AIDS in male homosexuals
is 7.8 years, which is comparable to the 8.2 year estimate for transfusion-related AIDS
transmission).
51. See Moss, supra note 8, at 17 (stating that at the beginning of the AIDS epi-
demic, certain groups appeared to be uniquely at risk of HIV infection).
52. See Papelian, supra note 4, at 652 (explaining that out of the 70,000 people
diagnosed with AIDS between 1981 and 1988, 70% were homosexual or bisexual men,
19% were IV drug users, 4% were heterosexuals, 3% were transfusion recipients, and 1%
were hemophiliacs exposed to contaminated blood); see also Moss, supra note 8, at 17
(observing that prostitutes, Africans, and those who had sex with a member of a high-risk
group were later added to the list of high-risk groups).
53. See Moss, supra note 8, at 17 (arguing that behavior rather than membership
places one at risk for contracting HIV).
54. Id. (arguing that the "high-risk group" notion is "fatally flawed" because it pro-
motes a false sense of security among those not classified as high risk). See supra note 30
(noting that over 95% of Americans do not believe they are at risk of contracting AIDS).
A scheme involving "high-risk groups" also may encourage discrimination against those
who are designated "high risk." Id.
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quency,55 behavior modification has been offered as a solution
to the AIDS crisis.56 The drastic increase of AIDS in these
groups has rendered it virtually impossible to assess the risk of
contracting AIDS from a particular partner.5 7 Engaging in any
sexual conduct when one does not know the full sexual history
of one's partner and all that partner's past partners exposes one
to the risk of contracting the virus.58 Given that 1 to 1.5 million
people may be unaware they are HIV positive,59 this risk may
be growing at an exponential rate.
F. Prospects for a Cure
Substantial progress has been made in controlling the op-
portunistic infections and secondary cancers associated with
AIDS.60 These recent advances in managing the symptoms and
manifestations of AIDS have improved the quality and dura-
tion of life for AIDS patients.61 The virus is fatal, however, in
patients who progress to full-blown AIDS.62 There also is still
55. See generally MERCK RESEARCH LABORATORIES, supra note 11, at 80 (noting
that while less than 10% of those who were infected with AIDS were women, AIDS was
increasing more rapidly among women than men); Centers for Disease Control, Update:
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome - United States 1991, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTAL-
ITY WKLY. PP. 463, 464 (July 3, 1992) [hereinafter Centers for Disease Control, Update]
(reporting that the percentage of women infected with HIV during 1991 increased by
15%); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 14, at 67 (predicting that if cur-
rent trends continue AIDS will soon become one of the five leading causes of death among
women of reproductive age); Moss, supra note 8, at 18 (reporting that AIDS is now the
leading cause of death among young women in New York).
56. See Moss, supra note 8, at 17-18 (arguing that because it is one's behavior that
creates the risk of contracting AIDS, the AIDS epidemic will not subside unless all people
engage in safe practices).
57. Id. at 18 (arguing that as AIDS becomes more rampant there may be very few
people who have never been exposed to the risk of contracting AIDS). This situation is
further complicated because some people have contracted the virus after engaging in un-
protected sexual relations with only one or two partners while others have been exposed to
the virus repeatedly over a number of years and never contracted AIDS. Id.
58. See id. (observing that absent knowledge that a partner has a clear history of
high-risk activity or has never engaged in high-risk activity, it is virtually impossible to
assess the degree of risk).
59. See supra text accompanying note 28 (noting that 1 to 1.5 million people are
infected with HIV).
60. See Moss, supra note 8, at 46 (noting that the immune system can now be moni-
tored much more accurately allowing for more effective diagnosis, prevention, and treat-
ment of tumors and infections caused by AIDS).
61. Id.
62. SCENARIO COMMI-rEE, supra note 13, at 4 (referring to AIDS as a fatal
disease).
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no cure for AIDS.6 3 Moreover, a vaccine is unlikely to be de-
veloped in the near future because HIV changes its genetic
makeup frequently. 64
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Venereal Disease Model and Case Law
Numerous commentators suggest that the courts should
recognize a negligence cause of action for the sexual transmis-
sion of AIDS. 5 These commentators argue that the liability
rules in AIDS cases should be based on an analogy to cases
involving the sexual transmission of venereal diseases and geni-
tal herpes. 66
The duty to take reasonable measures to avoid infecting a
sexual partner with a venereal disease is well-established.67 The
courts also have generally applied this analysis in cases involv-
ing genital herpes. 68 Commentators have placed particular em-
phasis on cases involving the transmission of genital herpes
since genital herpes, like AIDS, is incurable and has a long
latency period.69
63. Moss, supra note 8, at 46.
64. Id. at 54.
65. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (providing an illustrative sampling of
commentators who have taken this view).
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276-77 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (finding a duty not to infect another with a sexual disease even where the parties are
unmarried); Long v. Adams, 333 S.E.2d 852, 854 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that sexu-
ally active partners owe a general duty of reasonable care not to infect their partners);
Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206, 208-10 (N.C. 1920), reh'g denied, 106 S.E. 149 (N.C.
1920) (holding a husband liable for the negligent transmission of gonorrhea to his wife);
Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863 (1979) (recogniz-
ing the validity of a negligence action for transmission of gonorrhea during a brief
relationship).
68. See Papelian, supra note 4, at 663 (noting that courts have generally found geni-
tal herpes substantially similar to venereal diseases justifying the extension of venereal dis-
ease case law to cover genital herpes). See also Kathleen K., 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276 (hold-
ing that genital herpes is actionable under the venereal disease statute); Long, 333 S.E.2d
at 856 (finding that while herpes is not a venereal disease, it is serious and incurable and
the state has an interest in preventing its spread); R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 108
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (imposing a duty to either avoid sexual contact or warn one's part-
ner of the risk of contracting genital herpes).
69. See, e.g. Elber, supra note 4, at 923-24 (stating that genital herpes provides the
closest counterpart to AIDS based on genital herpes' means of transmission, latency period,
and incurability); Papelian, supra note 4, at 663 (contending that genital herpes cases are
most analogous to AIDS cases because genital herpes has a long latency period and is
incurable).
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Courts originally based the duty not to transmit venereal
diseases to a sexual partner on the nature of the relationship
between the parties. In Crowell v. Crowell,70 the Supreme
Court of North Carolina became the first court to recognize
the validity of a negligence cause of action for the sexual trans-
mission of a venereal disease."' The court stated "it is a well-
settled proposition of law that a person is liable if he negli-
gently exposes another to a contagious disease. '7 2 Similarly, in
Maharam v. Maharam,7 8 the court found that a thirty-one
year marriage provided the basis for imposing an affirmative
duty to warn one's spouse of the risk of infection. 4 Since these
cases involved husbands and wives, the decisions were limited
to marital relationships.
The courts eventually expanded the scope of this duty to
warn by finding a duty regardless of the nature of the relation-
ship between the parties. In Long v. Adams,"5 the plaintiff pre-
vailed on her negligence claim after being infected with genital
herpes even though the parties were unmarried.76 While explic-
itly declining to find a general duty to warn, the court held that
sexual partners owe a duty of reasonable care to their part-
ners. 7 In Duke v. Housen, 8 the plaintiff brought a negligence
action claiming that she was infected with gonorrhea after a
seventeen-day relationship with the defendant.79 The trial court
held that the defendant had a duty to warn and awarded dam-
ages. 80 While the Wyoming Supreme Court vacated the judg-
ment because the statute of limitations had run, the court
stated "[o]ne who negligently exposes another to an infectious
or contagious disease, which such other person thereby con-
tracts, can be held liable in damages.""'
70. 105 S.E. at 206.
71. Id. at 208. While the complaint alleged assault and not negligence the court
stated that "an action for negligence would exist independent of fraud." Id.
72. Id.
73. 123 A.D.2d 165, 170-71 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (holding that the violation of a
statute prohibiting the transmission of venereal diseases may constitute negligence per se).
74. Id. at 170.
75. 333 S.E.2d 852 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
76. Id. at 853.
77. Id. at 854-55.
78. 589 P.2d at 334, 337 (Wyo. 1979).
79. Id. at 338.
80. Id. at 339-40.
81. Id. at 340.
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In Kathleen K. v. Robert B.,82 the court clearly articulated
a rationale for imposing a duty even where the sexual partners
are not married. The California Court of Appeals rejected the
defendant's argument that no confidential trust relationship ex-
ists when sexual partners are unmarried. 3 The court reasoned
that a party to an intimate relationship is entitled to a certain
degree of confidence and trust that his/her partner is not in-
fected with a disease.84 Thus, the court recognized the value of
preserving the trust and confidence that is an inherent part of
an intimate relationship.
The Kathleen K. decision is particularly significant be-
cause the court implicitly included AIDS within the state's ve-
nereal disease statute.8 5 The court found that genital herpes is
sufficiently similar to venereal diseases to be actionable under
the state's venereal disease statute.88 Moreover, the court sug-
gested that AIDS also might be actionable under the state
statute:
Like AIDS (genital herpes) is now known by the public to be
a contagious and dreadful disease .... If a person knowingly
has genital herpes, AIDS or some other contagious and seri-
ous disease, a limited representation that he or she does not
have a venereal disease is no defense to this type of action. 7
However, it is important to note that the court specifically re-
ferred to a defendant who "knowingly" creates a risk of
spreading a sexual disease. 8  Since most individuals who are
HIV-positive do not know they are infected,8 9 the applicability
of the court's analysis to AIDS cases is unclear.
B. The Analogy to Venereal Disease Cases in the AIDS
Context
By analogizing AIDS to venereal disease and genital
herpes cases, commentators have emphasized the importance of
imposing liability on would-be defendants to avoid the sexual
82. 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
83. Id. at 276-77.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 276 n.3.
86. Id.
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29 (explaining that 1 to 1.5 million people
who are infected with HIV may be asymptomatic).
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transmission of AIDS.90 Several rationales have been offered to
justify placing the entire burden of care on defendants. Some
have argued that because many HIV-positive individuals are
asymptomatic, plaintiffs cannot effectively rely on sensory evi-
dence to guard against contracting the virus.9 1 Second, impos-
ing a duty on plaintiffs to avoid the spread of AIDS may en-
courage reckless conduct by those who are HIV-positive and
contribute to the spread of AIDS. 2 Finally, since AIDS is fa-
tal, there is an even greater imperative to impose liability on
defendants than in venereal disease and genital herpes cases."8
Commentators argue that the affirmative defenses of con-
tributory or comparative negligence, or assumption of the risk9"
90. See, e.g., David P. Brigham, You Never Told Me... You Never Asked, Tort
Liability for the Sexual Transmission of AIDS, 91 DICK. L. REv. 529, 546 (1986) (argu-
ing that imposing a duty on plaintiffs in AIDS cases is neither an "effective or equitable
proposition"); DelaRosa, supra note 4, at 111 (arguing that the duty in AIDS cases must
remain on the defendants because most of the people infected with HIV display no symp-
toms so potential partners cannot protect themselves); Burdt & Caldwell, supra note 5, at
679-80 (suggesting that if a defendant does not have obvious symptoms or is not a member
of a high-risk group, "there is a strong argument that the plaintiff should not be required
to inquire about the defendant's health"); Richard C. Shoenstein, Note, Standards of Con-
duct, Multiple Defendants, and Full Recovery of Damages in Tort Liability for the Trans-
mission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 37, 66-72 (1989) (sug-
gesting that alternative liability's shifting of the burden of proof to defendants in AIDS
cases should be used to facilitate plaintiffs bringing a negligence cause of action).
91. See DelaRosa, supra note 4, at 111 (stating that because most HIV-positive indi-
viduals are asymptomatic, plaintiffs are not in a position to identify those infected with
HIV and avoid sexual contact with them).
92. See Brigham, supra note 90, at 546 (stating that the "only way" to prevent the
spread of AIDS is to impose liability on potential defendants); Elber, supra note 4, at 945
(commenting that allowing defendants to assert affirmative defenses in AIDS cases may
encourage reckless conduct that will spread the disease). See also Burdt & Caldwell, supra
note 5, at 679 (contrasting a substantial public policy interest in protecting public health
with the recognition of the assumption of the risk in AIDS cases).
93. See Elber, supra note 4, at 941 (contending that recognition of assumption of the
risk in AIDS cases is outweighed by the societal imperative of preventing the spread of
AIDS, which is fatal).
94. Contributory negligence imposes a duty on plaintiffs to take reasonable measures
to avoid exposing themselves to an unreasonable risk of harm. See W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 451 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER ON TORTS]. If the plaintiff fails to take reasonable care to avoid injury, he is
barred from recovery. Id. § 65, at 451-52. Similarly, comparative negligence requires a
plaintiff to take reasonable care to avoid being injured. See generally id. § 67, at 468-74
(discussing comparative negligence as a means of apportioning damages to avoid com-
pletely barring claims under contributory negligence). Comparative negligence does not bar
recovery entirely; rather it merely reduces the award in proportion to the plaintiff's fault.
Id. By contrast, assumption of the risk bars recovery when the plaintiff voluntarily takes a
known risk even if his conduct is reasonable. See generally id. § 68, at 490 (explaining that
the plaintiff's consent to take the risk relieves the defendant of the duty to act reasonably).
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should not be a bar in AIDS transmission cases. 95 These com-
mentators note the courts' reluctance to recognize these de-
fenses in cases involving other sexually transmitted diseases.96
The traditional reluctance is based on the courts' unwillingness
to embrace the view "that the risk of contracting [a] disease
must be assumed when entering a sexual relationship. 97 Thus,
no duty is imposed on would-be plaintiffs in venereal disease
cases. By extension, commentators generally have argued that
the courts should not impose such a duty in AIDS cases.98
This analysis relies heavily on the similarity between
AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. Commentators
emphasize that the only significant difference between AIDS
and other sexually transmitted diseases, particularly genital
herpes, is that AIDS is deadly.9 Further, commentators con-
tend that the fatal nature of AIDS makes it even more impera-
tive that liability be imposed on defendants in AIDS cases. 100
95. See, e.g., Elber, supra note 4, at 941 (stating that recognizing the assumption of
the risk defense in AIDS cases is likely to contribute to the spread of AIDS by granting
immunity to defendants); Burdt & Caldwell, supra note 5, at 679 (contending that there is
a strong public policy rationale against permitting the assumption of the risk defense in
AIDS cases as evidenced by numerous state statutes prohibiting the transmission of vene-
real diseases). See also Brigham, supra note 90, at 546 (rejecting the notion of imposing a
duty to inquire on plaintiffs in AIDS cases); DelaRosa, supra note 4, at 111 (advocating
that any duty to disclose or abstain must fall upon the infected party). But see Papelian,
supra note 4, at 676 (suggesting that recognizing assumption of the risk would impose the
responsibility of taking precaution on both parties in a sexual relationship).
96. See, e.g., Papelian, supra note 4, at 677 (observing that the defenses of contrib-
utory negligence and assumption of the risk have proven unsuccessful in sexual disease
cases). See also Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 277 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (finding that the plaintiff's consent to intercourse was ineffective where infection
with a venereal disease was fraudulently concealed).
97. Papelian, supra note 4, at 677.
98. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the consensus among
commentators in favor of rejecting affirmative defenses which would place a burden on
would-be defendants).
99. See Elber, supra note 4, at 924 (observing that while genital herpes is not fatal,
it is similar to AIDS because genital herpes has a latency period and is incurable).
100. Id. (arguing that since AIDS is fatal even "stricter legal boundaries of civil
liability" are appropriate). See also Fredrickson, supra note 4, at 970-71 (stating that
imposing a duty on defendants in AIDS cases may be even more imperative because the
consequences of contracting AIDS are "far more horrific and devastating" than con-
tracting other sexually transmitted diseases).
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C. Shortcomings of the Venereal Disease Model in the
AIDS Context
The most significant inadequacy of the venereal disease
model in the AIDS context is its dependence on two related
assumptions. The first assumption is that the difference in the
magnitude of harm between AIDS and other sexually transmit-
ted diseases should not significantly affect the courts' analy-
sis.101 The other assumption is that even if the difference in
harm is treated as a significant factor, the more substantial
harm from AIDS justifies imposing even more stringent liabil-
ity on would-be defendants.10 2  These two assumptions are
hardly self-evident.
The magnitude of harm is one of the most significant fac-
tors in defining an appropriate standard of care.'03 In the semi-
nal case of United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,10 4 Judge
Learned Hand articulated the significance of the degree of
harm in finding a duty to take care. 05 Judge Learned Hand
explained that the duty to take care is a function of three vari-
ables:106 (1) the probability of harm (P); (2) the magnitude of
loss (L); and (3) the burden of taking adequate precautions
(B).07 Based on this analysis, he concluded that if PxL, no lia-
bility should be imposed.108 Thus, if the probability of harm is
minimal, a court may find a duty where the magnitude of harm
is great and decline to find a duty where the magnitude of
101. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (distinguishing AIDS from other sex-
ually transmitted diseases because AIDS is deadly).
102. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (discussing commentators' view that
the greater magnitude of harm in AIDS cases imposes an even greater moral imperative to
ensure that defendants who infect others are held liable).
103. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 291 (1977) (suggesting that where
the gravity of harm is extremely great, courts will find a duty). See also Rowland v. Chris-
tian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1964) (outlining the factors that serve as criteria for finding
a duty of care); PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 94, § 31 (noting that even if the odds are a
thousand-to-one against a train arriving at an intersection at the same time a car does, the
potential harm of death is serious enough to require the driver to look for a train).
104. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
105. See id. at 173 (explaining that if the burden of adequate precautions exceeds
the probability of harm multiplied by the degree of harm, no duty will lie).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
[Vol. 5:397
1995] IT TAKES TWO TO TANGO 413
harm is small."0 9 Since the magnitude of harm resulting from
infection with HIV far exceeds that of genital herpes,"'0 AIDS
requires a very different result.
Moreover, the assumption that any increase in the magni-
tude of harm justifies imposing even more stringent liability is
also questionable. AIDS is already responsible for enormous so-
cial costs."" The tort system is an expensive method of allocat-
ing costs because it entails substantial transaction costs. 1 '
These transaction costs are justified only if imposing more
stringent liability yields an offsetting increase in social
utility.113
D. The Venereal Disease Model and Goals of the Tort
System
The significance of the venereal disease model's failure to
account for the social costs of AIDS becomes evident when ex-
amined in light of the traditional goals of the tort system. The
tort system has been viewed as having three broad objectives:
(1) reinforcing social norms; (2) compensating victims; and (3)
discouraging unsafe conduct."1 4 The objective of reinforcing so-
cietal norms is a two-fold concern. First, tort law reflects social
109. PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 94, § 31 (stating "[a]s the gravity of the possi-
ble harm increases, the apparent likelihood of its occurrence need be correspondingly less
to generate a duty of precaution").
110. The injury inflicted by transmitting genital herpes consists of painful sores and
blisters on the genitals, thighs, and buttocks as a well as painful urination. In women,
blisters also develop on the cervix. Laurence Corey & Patricia G. Spear, Infections with
Herpes Simplex Viruses (pt. 2), 314 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 749, 750 (1986). In contrast,
AIDS is a fatal disease that requires enormous medical expenditures by the individual as
well as the public. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37 (examining the enormous
public and private medical expenditures AIDS entails).
111. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text (discussing the nature and scope
of the social costs associated with the AIDS crisis).
112. Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability,
73 CAL L. REV. 677, 733 (1985) (stating that litigation is a very expensive means of allo-
cating loss); see also Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort The-
ory, and Beyond, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 23 (1990) (noting that the tort system is "very
expensive"); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 596
(1985) (observing that the tort system is "fabulously expensive" and entails significant
public expense).
113. See Latin, supra note 112, at 733 (arguing that imposing liability is justified
only if the resulting increase in social utility is commensurate with the increase in transac-
tion costs).
114. See Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIo ST.
LI. 443, 455 (1987) (observing that most scholars list these as the principle objectives of
tort law).
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norms against activities with relatively little social utility when
compared with their risk of injury." 5 These norms are rein-
forced by imposing liability because the tortfeasor is punished,
and the violation and punishment are publicized.116 Second,
tort law reinforces corrective justice social norms. Society gen-
erally holds that when a wrongdoer injures someone the wrong-
doer and not the injured party should bear the loss. " 7
The venereal disease model does not effectively reinforce
either of these social norms in AIDS transmission cases. This
model imposes no duty of care on would-be plaintiffs. " 8 Thus,
social norms against unsafe conduct are reinforced for AIDS
carriers but not their partners although both parties to a sexual
relationship engage in unsafe conduct by failing to take ade-
quate precautions to avoid infection. Social norms against un-
safe conduct also are not reinforced because plaintiffs fre-
quently will be unable to recover from those who infect them.
Recovery is unlikely because the long latency period and fatal
nature of AIDS means that many defendants will be judgment-
proof by the time a decision is rendered.1 9 Even if a defendant
is solvent at the time of infection, the long latency period of
AIDS makes proving causation extremely difficult.'20 Because
would-be defendants will rarely pay damages out of their own
pocket, it is unlikely that imposing liability will reinforce social
norms against unsafe conduct. 2' Similarly, this inability of
115. See id. at 458 (stating that a breach of the required standard of care constitutes
the violation of a social norm).
116. See id. at 455 (arguing that it is critical to maintaining the norm against unsafe
conduct that the wrongdoer be punished and his violation be publicized).
117. See Sugarman, supra note 112, at 603 (noting that the norm of corrective jus-
tice derives from the view that it is only morally right that the injurer bear the loss).
118. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (discussing the rejection of af-
firmative defenses as a means of imposing a duty on plaintiffs in venereal disease cases).
119. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing the depressed eco-
nomic status of some AIDS patients and their potential dependence on public funds).
120. See, e.g., Brigham, supra note 90, at 548 (stating that "the plaintiff's ability to
prove that the defendant was the one who actually transmitted the disease may be tenuous
at best"); Elber, supra note 4, at 939 (listing AIDS' long latency period as a reason why
proving causation will be difficult in AIDS cases). Plaintiffs also may be unable to prove
causation because AIDS may be transmitted by means other than sexual contact. See id.
(listing this among reasons proving causation in AIDS cases will be difficult); Burdt &
Caldwell, supra note 5, at 676 (noting that proving causation will pose problems in AIDS
cases because HIV is transmitted by means other than sexual intercourse). See generally
supra part II.C. (discussing the means by which AIDS may be transmitted).
121. See generally supra note 116 and accompanying text (explaining that tort law
reinforces social norms by sanctioning the tortfeasor and publicizing the violation).
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plaintiffs to recover also means corrective justice norms will not
be reinforced. Since defendants will frequently be judgment-
proof,12 2  medical costs often will not be shifted from the
"wrongdoer" to the "injured party."
The second goal of tort law, compensation, generally is
viewed as the primary objective of the tort system.'23 The em-
phasis on compensation reflects society's compassion for a per-
son who has been wrongfully injured.2 4 Compensation is also
intended to address certain economic concerns. 12  A key eco-
nomic concern is restoring the productive capacity of the vic-
tim."' 8 A related concern is preventing the victim from becom-
ing dependent on public funds. 2
The venereal disease model also fails to promote compen-
sation goals in AIDS transmission cases. Other sexual diseases
generally do not render those infected destitute'2 8 so the tradi-
tional model effectively shifts losses from those infected to
those they infect. However, since defendants in AIDS cases will
often be judgment-proof, 2 9 there can be no comparable shift-
ing of losses. Moreover, even if a defendant is not judgment-
proof, payment of damages may only hasten the defendant's
own dependence on public funds.' 30
The third goal of tort law, deterrence, is the most contro-
versial.' 3' Many courts 3 2 and commentators""8 still view deter-
122. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (observing that the long latency
period and fatal nature of AIDS will leave many defendants judgment-proof).
123. See Abel, supra note 114, at 456 (noting that twentieth century tort law makes
compensation the primary objective of the tort system). See also Sugarman, supra note
112, at 591 (discussing the increased popularity of viewing the tort system's primary goal
as compensation).
124. See Abel, supra note 114, at 456 (noting that for some commentators the moti-
vation for making compensation the central objective of tort law is compassion for injured
parties).
125. Id.
126. Id. (listing this concern as a factor justifying the view that compensation is the
central goal of tort law).
127. Id. (listing this concern as an economic motivation for the central role of com-
pensation in tort law).
128. See generally supra note I10 (contrasting AIDS with genital herpes, the only
other incurable sexually transmitted disease).
129. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text (discussing the dependence of
some AIDS patients on public funds and the insurance industry's response to the AIDS
crisis).
131. See generally Sugarman, supra note 112, at 564-90 (providing a comprehensive
criticism of tort law's effectiveness as a deterrent to dangerous conduct).
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rence as a fundamental objective of tort law. However, recently
tort law's effectiveness as a deterrent has been criticized by
proponents of tort reform.3 While a detailed evaluation of
these criticisms is beyond the scope of this Note, some of these
criticisms are particularly pertinent to AIDS transmission
cases.
One set of criticisms emphasize the deterrent effect of
other factors, such as self-preservation and personal moral-
ity.'13 Self-preservation deters tortious conduct because would-
be defendants often endanger themselves by such conduct. The
desire to avoid causing injury to one's own body may discour-
age conduct that endangers others.3 6 Personal morality also
discourages unsafe conduct if the defendant perceives the risk
of harm to others. 87 Self-preservation and personal morality
may be much more influential than the tenuous possibility of
tort liability in deterring conduct likely to spread AIDS. This
distinction is particularly true because AIDS is fatal. Conse-
quently, the marginal gain in deterrence from imposing liability
may not justify the transaction costs associated with the tort
system.'88
A more fundamental criticism of the deterrence rationale
focuses on the tort system's frequent failure to sanction
132. See Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 KAN. L.
REV. 115, 131 (noting that judges and lawyers continue to emphasize the deterrence role of
tort law). See, e.g., Nicholas v. Homelite Corp., 780 F.2d 1150, 1153 (5th Cir. 1986)
(asserting that "the threat of a reduction in recovery will provide future consumers with
the very incentive for more careful use which the doctrine of comparative fault was in-
tended to engender"); Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 406 A.2d 704, 706 (N.H.
1979) (stating that "[tihe threat of tort liability acts as an incentive for persons... to take
steps to reduce the risk of injury").
133. See Shuman, supra note 132, at 131 (noting that commentators continue to
emphasize deterrence as a goal of tort law).
134. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (providing a comprehensive criti-
cism of deterrence as a goal of tort law).
135. Sugarman, supra note 112, at 561 (listing these as factors that deter potential
defendants from unsafe conduct).
136. Id. at 562 (arguing that the drive to protect oneself from injury also may pro-
tect others).
137. Id. at 563 (stating that "moral inhibitions serve to block self-satisfying behavior
that would unreasonably endanger others").
138. The transaction costs include the administrative costs associated with resolving
the dispute. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 262-
63 (1987) (discussing the administrative costs the parties to a lawsuit must incur). Specifi-
cally, these transaction costs include the time and effort spent by the parties as well as
their lawyers and insurers. Id. Substantial transaction costs are also incurred by the public
sector in operating the courts and the public health care system.
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tortfeasors. Monetary damages provide the primary mechanism
for imposing sanctions aimed at deterrence. The deterrence
theory rests on the premise that the threat of tort damages
forces would-be defendants to internalize accident costs. 13 9 The
resulting increase in the total cost of unsafe conduct provides
an incentive to avoid such conduct.1 40 Additionally, the fault
principle is designed to adjust the size of an award to influence
the conduct of both parties.' 4 The deterrence impact of judg-
ments is greatly diminished, however, when the judgments are
satisfied by insurance. 42 More significantly, the deterrence ef-
fect may be non-existent if the party is judgment-proof' 43 or
dependent on public funds.'" A low probability of a successful
suit also undermines deterrence goals.' 45 Numerous studies
show that the probability associated with imposing sanctions is
crucial to the sanctions' impact on behavior.' 46 Thus, the threat
of sanctions will be discounted when liability turns on issues
that are difficult to prove. 147
The venereal disease model also fails to promote these de-
terrence goals in AIDS transmission cases. Since actual recov-
139. See Latin, supra note 112, at 678 (explaining that deterrence theory is pre-
mised on a view that by increasing costs, liability provides an incentive to include the acci-
dent cost in cost-benefit analysis).
140. See generally SHAVELL, supra note 138, at 26-29 (discussing how a liability
rule's distribution of accident costs provides incentives to avoid dangerous conduct).
141. Sugarman, supra note 112, at 586 (noting that tort law uses fault principles to
discourage plaintiffs from engaging in dangerous conduct).
142. Id. at 573 (noting that the ability to completely insure against a risk shifts the
"direct" deterrent pressure to the insurer); see Guido Calabresi, First Party, Third Party,
and Product Liability Systems: Can Economic Analysis of Law Tell Us Anything About
Them?, 69 IowA L. REV. 833, 840 (1984) (noting that social insurance eliminates accident
avoidance incentives because losses are shifted to society as a whole).
143. See Shuman, supra note 132, at 120 (noting that deterrence only occurs where
would-be defendants are solvent); Sugarman, supra note 112, at 572 (arguing that the
threat of liability is not meaningful for would-be defendants with no wealth or income).
144. See Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848, 870 (4th Cir. 1980) (Winter, J., con-
curring and dissenting) (stating "the chilling effect.., of imposing personal liability ... is
much more attenuated when the liability is to be satisfied from governmental funds").
145. See Sugarman, supra note 112, at 569 (discussing the tendency of defendants
to discount the risk of liability based on the difficulty plaintiffs face in proving factual
issues).
146. Shuman, supra note 132, at 121 (observing that empirical research has conclu-
sively shown that the certainty of sanctions significantly influences the level of deterrence).
Research also has shown that the severity is not as influential and only becomes relevant
after a certain threshold of certainty is reached. Id.
147. See Sugarman, supra note 112, at 569.
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ery is problematic in AIDS cases, 143 would-be defendants may
not internalize the cost of potential tort damages.1 49 Moreover,
the deterrent effect of tort liability is further diminished by
some AIDS patients' dependence on public funds.1 "'
Finally, because the venereal disease model imposes a duty
only on those who are infected, 1 their partners' unsafe con-
duct is not deterred. In venereal disease cases, the courts avoid
imposing a duty on plaintiffs because courts view sexual rela-
tionships as confidential trust relationships. 5 The courts rea-
son that the intimate nature of the relationship should allow
sexual partners to trust that their partner will not infect
them.' 53 Since most other sexual diseases are less severe than
AIDS,'54 promoting trust and confidence in intimate relation-
ships may justify allowing plaintiffs to rely entirely on their
partners to take precautions. AIDS, however, entails much
more staggering costs on both the individual and society.
Avoiding these substantial costs outweighs the importance of
promoting unconditional trust and confidence in intimate
relationships.
Determining the most appropriate allocation of the duty of
care in AIDS cases requires an examination of the costs and
benefits of available alternatives. The next section of this Note
will examine the possible alternatives available under the vene-
real disease model, where the entire burden of care falls on de-
fendants. This model will be contrasted with a proposal that
attempts to fairly balance the burden of care between both sex-
ual partners.
148. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (explaining that AIDS victims may
be judgment-proof).
149. See generally supra notes 140-43 (discussing the means by which liability
forces parties to internalize accident costs and the impact of private and public insurance
on this internalization process).
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text (discussing commentators' view
that comparative or contributory negligence and assumption of the risk should be rejected
in AIDS cases as in other venereal disease cases).
152. See Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(finding that a fiduciary relationship exists in sexual relationships between unmarried part-
ners). The court specifically noted that a certain amount of trust and confidence exists in
all intimate relations. Id. See also Edward Barron Estate Co. v. Woodruff Co., 126 P. 351,
357 (Cal. 1912) (stating "when one of the parties.., places a known trust and confidence
in the other, any misrepresentation ... is regarded as fraud").
153. See id.
154. See supra note 110 (contrasting AIDS with genital herpes).
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E. Possible Scope of Defendant's Duty
Negligence is the failure to conform to the standard of
care required by law to protect others from an unreasonable
risk of harm.155 The courts will not find a defendant negligent
unless he owes the injured party a duty of care.' 56 The duty
issue can be viewed as a two-tiered analysis: (1) under what
circumstances does the defendant owe a duty of care; and (2)
what is the scope of the duty owed by the defendant.
Duty has sometimes been defined according to a cost-bene-
fit analysis.1 58 This analysis entails balancing the value of the
plaintiff's threatened interest against the value of the interest
the defendant is seeking to protect. 5 9 The courts weigh several
factors when performing this cost-benefit analysis including:
(1) foreseeability of harm; (2) degree of certainty that the
plaintiff was injured; (3) closeness in causal connection be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the resulting harm; (4) pre-
vention of future harm; (5) burden to the defendant and com-
munity of imposing a duty; and (6) ability to insure against the
risk.160
1. The Defendant's Duty to Disclose
Several possible standards of care could be imposed by the
courts in AIDS transmission cases. First, the courts could im-
pose a duty to disclose that one is HIV-positive.' 6' Considering
that the transmission of AIDS may lead to death and signifi-
cant public health expenditures,'162 a duty to disclose one's HIV
155. PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 94, § 30, at 164.
156. See id. (explaining that a negligence cause of action requires a duty of care).
157. See generally id. § 53, at 358-59 (discussing the factors upon which courts rely
when deciding to impose a duty).
158. See id. § 32, at 173 (outlining a test which balances the costs and benefits of
imposing a duty).
159. Id.
160. See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (listing these factors
as criteria for finding a duty).
161. See DelaRosa, supra note 4, at 109-10 (advocating a duty to disclose HIV sta-
tus be imposed because AIDS is fatal); Burdt & Caldwell, supra note 5, at 673 (suggesting
that since most courts recognize a duty to prevent the spread of venereal diseases, the duty
to disclose HIV status logically follows).
162. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text (analyzing the public expendi-
tures associated with AIDS).
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status seems a minimal burden.16 3 However, imposing a duty to
disclose may be impractical since an infected partner is not
likely to know that he is HIV-positive until he becomes sympto-
matic.16 4 When the defendant is not aware of his HIV status,
courts must determine what gives rise to the duty to disclose.6 5
A defendant need not possess "actual" knowledge of a risk for
a duty to be imposed.16 6 However, the defendant must possess
knowledge which would lead a reasonable person to recognize
that his conduct poses a significant risk of harm.1' 7 Some com-
mentators have argued that a defendant who is in a high-risk
group has a reason to know that sexual contact poses an unrea-
sonable risk of harm. 68
What constitutes high-risk activity has not been carefully
analyzed.' 69 AIDS is no longer a disease that is confined to a
163. See Brigham, supra note 90, at 545-46 (arguing that the defendant should bear
a duty to disclose or abstain because the burden is inconsequential when compared to "the
emotional trauma, hospital care and expenses, and the high possibility of death an AIDS
patient faces").
164. The long asymptomatic stage of AIDS poses a unique risk because a defendant
may not have any physical symptoms which would cause him to recognize the danger he
poses to others. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing the danger of
AIDS being spread by asymptomatic HIV carriers who underestimate the probability of
transmitting the virus). Moreover, because antibodies frequently do not show up until six
months and sometimes a year after the infection, a defendant cannot even ascertain his
HIV status during this window period. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing AIDS' six to twelve month latency period).
165. A number of commentators have suggested that membership in a "traditional
high-risk group," such as IV drug users or homosexuals, should be sufficient to impose a
duty to warn. See, e.g., Roger B. Gainor, Note, To Have and To Hold: Tort Liability for
the Interspousal Transmission of AIDS, 23 NEw. ENG. L. REv. 887, 905-06 (1988-89)
(suggesting that a defendant who is in a high-risk group has a duty to protect his spouse);
Schoenstein, supra note 90, at 59 (arguing that high-risk group status could be a basis for
imposing a duty). See also Braden, supra note 3, at 300 (noting one commentator's view
that membership in a high-risk group would create a significant risk of harm). However, at
least one commentator has expressly rejected the notion that high-risk group status alone
should be sufficient to impose a duty to warn. See, Papelian, supra note 4, at 665-66 (argu-
ing that the courts are unlikely to find high risk alone sufficient to impose a duty).
166. See generally PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 94, § 32, at 182 (explaining that
knowledge will be imputed to a defendant where the defendant does not perceive what is
apparent to a reasonably prudent person).
167. See generally id. § 32, at 184-85 (noting that when an individual possesses
knowledge which would lead a reasonable person to investigate, the defendant cannot pro-
ceed in "conscious ignorance").
168. See supra note 165 (listing commentators who espouse this view).
169. See, e.g., Schoenstein, supra note 165, at 59 (suggestihig that the courts use IV
drug use, homosexuality, and sexual intercourse with multiple partners as a basis for im-
posing liability).
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few demographic groups.11 0 A person is placed at risk for con-
tracting AIDS by high-risk behavior, not by membership in a
particular demographic group.171 Given the rapid growth of
AIDS in the heterosexual community,172 the courts should con-
sider the inequity of imposing a duty exclusively on "traditional
high-risk groups," such as homosexuals and IV drug users.
The inequity of imposing a duty only on traditional high-
risk groups is even more troubling because such a duty would
invade the zone of privacy surrounding intimate sexual rela-
tionships.7  In Lasher v. Kleinberg, 74 a father's cross-com-
plaint for wrongful birth based on the plaintiff's false claim
that she was using birth control was dismissed7 5 because the
court characterized the cross-complaint as "nothing more than
asking the court to supervise the promises made between two
consenting adults [concerning their] private sexual conduct."' 7
Under Lasher's holding, a court's attempt to supervise promises
between consenting adults regarding their sexual conduct
would constitute an impermissible intrusion into the privacy
surrounding intimate sexual relationships.7 The court specifi-
cally observed that "[c]laims such as [these] . . . arise from
conduct so intensely private that the courts should not be asked
to nor attempt to resolve [them]. ' 1 78 Similarly, in In Re L.
Pamela P., 79 the court rejected a wrongful birth claim because
the claim required an inquiry constituting an "impermissible
invasion of the 'zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees.' "180
170. See supra notes 2, 55 and accompanying text (surveying the rapid spread of
AIDS outside traditional high-risk groups).
171. See Moss, supra note 8, at 17 (stating that the notion of high-risk groups is
"fatally flawed" because it promotes a false sense of security among those not designated
"high risk").
172. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (observing that AIDS is spreading
more rapidly among heterosexuals than any other demographic group).
173. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that an individual has a right to
privacy in his or her sexual relationships. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-
54 (1972) (finding that the right to privacy prohibits the government from intruding into
decisions as fundamental as whether to bear or beget a child).
174. 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
175. Id. at 619.
176. Id. at 620.
177. See id. at 621.
178. Id. at 619.
179. 451 N.Y.S.2d 766 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
180. Id. at 767 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)).
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However, the right to privacy in intimate relations can be
infringed if governmental intrusion is warranted.""' In Barbara
A. v. John G.,' 82 the court permitted a duty to be imposed on a
father trying to evade support obligations, 83 explicitly rejecting
the defendant's claim that imposing a duty of care would vio-
late his right to privacy.'8 4 The court emphasized the strong
public policy against eliminating much or all of the father's fi-
nancial support to the child. 8 5
In Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 86 the right to privacy defense
also was rejected. 187 The plaintiff alleged that she was infected
with genital herpes despite the defendant's assurances that he
was free of venereal disease, and the court concluded that the
complaint stated a cause of action.' 88
The right to privacy may pose a significant barrier to im-
posing a duty in AIDS cases. Most commentators have relied
heavily on Kathleen K. as a basis for imposing a duty in AIDS
cases. "'89 This analysis relies on the view that preventing the
spread of disease and compensating the victim justify invading
the right to privacy. 90 However, the tort system is poorly
equipped to promote the traditional goals of tort law in AIDS
transmission cases.' 9' Given the tenuous link in AIDS cases be-
tween imposing liability and traditional tort goals, the state's
181. See Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 430 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (stat-
ing that the "right to privacy is not absolute," and the state may enact laws to protect
public health even though they infringe on the right to privacy).
182. Id. at 422.
183. See id. at 426-427 (finding that a mother could state a cause of action despite
the defendant's claim that it would invade his right to privacy).
184. See id. at 431 (holding that no public policy concerns were established which
would permit the right to privacy to insulate the defendant's tortious conduct from judicial
inquiry into his sexual relations).
185. See id. at 429 (observing that assessing damages based on the mother's false
representations would have the practical effect of reducing the father's financial support of
the child).
186. 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
187. Id. at 276.
188. Id. at 277.
189. See, e.g., Fredrickson, supra note 4, at 974 (stating that the courts reasoning in
Kathleen K. would "obviously" apply to AIDS cases); Gainor, supra note 165, at 913-14
(contending that based on Kathleen K., the right to privacy would not bar claims in AIDS
cases).
190. See Fredrickson, supra note 4, at 974 (stating that the right to privacy would
be outweighed by public policy concerns about the spread of AIDS); Gainor, supra note
165, at 914 (arguing that the right to privacy would not bar a plaintiffs claim because of
the strong state interest in preventing the spread of AIDS).
191. See supra part III.D.
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rationale for invading an intimate consensual relationship may
not be sufficiently compelling. Thus, the courts may decline to
invade the right to privacy by imposing a duty to disclose ex-
clusively on defendants.
Imposing a duty to disclose high-risk status also might vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause. 92 A classification scheme
that involves a fundamental right, such as the right to privacy,
is subject to strict scrutiny.193 Unless there is a compelling state
interest and the means are narrowly tailored, the state may not
infringe on the right to privacy.194 The Equal Protection Clause
is violated if: (1) those similarly situated are treated differently;
or (2) those not similarly situated are treated the same.1 95
As noted above, a duty imposed solely on defendants to
disclose high-risk status might not sufficiently promote tort
goals to constitute a compelling state interest. Even if a court
found a compelling state interest, the scheme is not narrowly
tailored. Since "high-risk behavior" rather than "high-risk sta-
tus" creates a risk of HIV infection, 9 ' a legal rule that empha-
sizes status rather than behavior is inherently more suspect
under Equal Protection Clause analysis.1 97
A duty based on high-risk status would be both underin-
clusive and overinclusive.198 The duty would be underinclusive
because it would impose no duty on heterosexuals engaging in
192. See Shoenstein, supra note 90, at 83 (stating that placing a higher burden on
those who engage in homosexual activities than those who engage in similar heterosexual
activities may violate the Equal Protection Clause).
193. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16.7, at 1438 (2d ed.
1988).
194. See id. § 16.6, at 1452 (observing that very few cases involving a fundamental
right have applied strict scrutiny and upheld a classification scheme). See also id. § 16.6,
at 1451 (noting Professor Gunther's characterization of strict scrutiny as strict in theory
and fatal in fact).
195. Id. § 16.1, at 1438.
196. See supra part II.E. (providing an overview of the shortcomings of "high-risk
groups" nomenclature).
197. See Shoenstein, supra note 90, at 84 (noting that legal principles aimed at a
specific conduct and not a particular class are more likely to withstand Equal Protection
Clause challenges).
198. Underinclusive analysis applies to a classification scheme that includes some
sources of a particular harm while excluding others. See TRIBE, supra note 193, at § 16.4,
at 1447 (explaining that underinclusive classifications exclude individuals similarly situated
with respect to a particular harm). Overinclusive analysis applies to classification schemes
that include persons who do not contribute to the harm. Id. § 16.4, at 1449.
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extremely high-risk activities. 19  Thus, a heterosexual would be
permitted to have many sexual partners and take no precau-
tions without having a duty imposed. Moreover, the duty would
be overinclusive because a homosexual who does not have mul-
tiple partners and takes precautions2 °" and an IV drug user
who never shares needles might be included even though a
"promiscuous" heterosexual poses a greater risk.
Arguably, the state may attempt to prevent the spread of
AIDS by attacking some aspects of the AIDS crisis while not
addressing others; however, high-risk behavior and not one's
membership in a particular demographic group is the sole fac-
tor that creates a risk of infection.201 A legal rule based on
high-risk conduct and not high-risk status would be a permissi-
ble means of addressing the AIDS crisis. One kind of high-risk
behavior could be targeted without including all other forms of
risky behavior.202 For example, a choice to concentrate on shar-
ing of IV drug needles rather than unsafe sexual practices
would be permissible. However, the tenuous fit between "high-
risk status" and the risk of spreading AIDS is unlikely to be
sufficient to withstand strict scrutiny.
These Equal Protection concerns could be addressed by
imposing a duty to disclose high-risk behavior rather than
membership in a "high-risk group." This scheme would include
non-drug using heterosexuals who have multiple sexual part-
ners without taking precautions.203 A duty to disclose high-risk
behavior creates a "perfect fit" between the classification
scheme and those whose behavior poses a significant risk.
However, a detailed inquiry into the frequency and nature
of one's sexual conduct more seriously invades the right to pri-
vacy. If the standard of care is a duty to disclose high-risk be-
199. See generally supra notes 2, 55 and accompanying text (discussing the spread
of AIDS among groups who have not traditionally been classified as high risk, such as
heterosexuals, women, and children).
200. See generally Peterson, supra note 43 (explaining that latex condoms are a
highly effective barrier to HIV infection).
201. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (noting that a person's behavior and
not membership in a particular demographic group places a person at risk for contracting
AIDS).
202. See TRIBE, supra note 193, § 16.4, at 1447 n.4 (noting that courts rarely invali-
date statutes exclusively on the basis of underinclusiveness).
203. See generally supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (noting that engaging
in any sexual conduct without knowing the sexual history of a partner or taking other
precautions creates a risk of contracting AIDS).
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havior, the courts will be forced to probe closely the sexual his-
tory of litigants. This inquiry would constitute a substantial
intrusion into the zone of privacy surrounding intimate rela-
tions. 0 4 Because such a disclosure requires specific details, the
requirement is even more intrusive than requiring disclosure of
high-risk status. Moreover, this type of inquiry might entail
substantial legal and administrative costs. 20
5
In Doe v. Doe,206 a New York court specifically declined
to impose a duty to disclose high-risk behavior 20 7 where a wife
alleged fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress
based on her husband's homosexual affairs.2 08 The court held
that the husband did not owe his wife a duty to disclose his
high-risk activities.2 0 9 While this case involved a plaintiff who
was not infected with HIV,21 0 the court's holding suggests that
the courts may be unwilling to delve deeply into the sexual his-
tory of litigants to find a duty.
Finally, some commentators would impose a duty to dis-
close on members of high-risk groups with physical symp-
toms. 211 This standard of care is reasonable but somewhat im-
practical. Much of the difficulty with defining a duty in AIDS
cases results from the long latency period of AIDS, which
leaves the majority of those infected without symptoms.21 2
Since most of those infected have no symptoms and are una-
ware of the risk they pose to others, 13 this standard of care
would apply to only a small number of those infected. Most
204. See generally Maharam v. Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986) (discussing the Supreme Court's protection of the sphere of privacy surrounding
intimate sexual relationships); see also supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
205. The additional fact finding entailed by a detailed inquiry into the sexual history
of the parties would necessarily increase litigation expenses. See SHAVELL, supra note 138,
at 262-63 (discussing the high administrative costs of litigation).
206. 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
207. See id. at 596-97.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 597.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., Brigham, supra note 90, at 546 (contending that those in high-risk
groups who manifest symptoms should have a duty to take care). Another commentator
argues that a member of a high-risk group who is exhibiting symptoms beyond a normal
illness should have a duty to warn. Elber, supra note 4, at 936.
212. See supra part II.D. (discussing the long stage during which the defendant has
no symptoms but is able to transmit the virus).
213. See Hancock, supra note 3, at 8 (stating that some of the 1 to 1.5 million
people infected with HIV may be unaware they are infected).
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importantly, this standard would not require those without
symptoms to alert their partners of a potential risk. 14
2. Defendant's Duty to Abstain
Commentators also have advocated imposing a duty on
people infected with HIV to abstain entirely from sexual con-
tact.2 15 Many of the issues raised by imposing a duty to warn
are also implicated by imposing a duty to abstain. There is a
problem in determining what gives rise to the duty to abstain.
It may be a relatively easy matter to impose a duty to abstain
on one who knows that he is HIV-positive; however, the long
latency period of the virus leaves many of those infected una-
ware of the risk of transmission.
Moreover, once those infected display physical manifesta-
tions, such as pneumonia symptoms, would-be plaintiffs have a
reason to be on notice. 6 It would seem reasonable to charge
plaintiffs with at least some duty of care once observable physi-
cal symptoms manifest themselves.
A duty to abstain would infringe more seriously on the
right to privacy than a disclosure requirement; 17 however, a
compelling interest may be asserted, such as protecting public
health or compensating innocent third parties. A duty to ab-
stain is unlikely to withstand strict scrutiny as a means of pro-
moting these interests. The means would not be narrowly tai-
lored to impose the minimum infringement on the right to
engage in intimate relations. There are several less restrictive
means, such as requiring disclosure of participation in high-risk
214. The asymptomatic status of most of those infected has been offered as a ration-
ale for imposing the whole burden of care on HIV carriers. See, e.g., DelaRosa, supra note
4, at 111 (contending that because many of those infected have no symptoms, uninfected
partners cannot protect themselves).
215. See, e.g., Elber, supra note 4, at 931 (contending that in the AIDS context, the
duty of reasonable care would be to abstain entirely from sexual activity).
216. See Burdt & Caldwell, supra note 5, at 675 (suggesting that a plaintiff may be
able to establish that the defendant "should have known" if the defendant was experienc-
ing symptoms). But see Brigham, supra note 90, at 546-47 (arguing that a symptomatic
party who is not in a high-risk group should not be imputed with knowledge of his HIV
status because it is difficult to differentiate the symptoms of HIV infection from common
illnesses).
217. A duty of disclosure necessarily entails some intrusion into the zone of privacy
protecting intimate relations. See discussion supra part III.E.1. However, the duty to ab-
stain entirely denies an individual's fundamental right to engage in intimate sexual rela-
tions. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (finding that a law requiring
mandatory sterilization of sex offenders violates the right to procreation).
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activity, use of a condom, or consent to an AIDS test. All of
these means would permit continued, albeit restricted, partici-
pation in intimate relationships.
3. Defendant's Duty to Be AIDS Tested
The courts also could require that defendants ascertain
their HIV status 18 before engaging in sexual relations. 19 This
approach has several benefits. First, since HIV tests are highly
reliable,220 this standard of care would assure that those who
comply do not inadvertently transmit the disease. Next to ab-
staining entirely, which more seriously infringes the right to
privacy, 221 imposing a duty to be tested is the surest way to
prevent the unintentional spread of AIDS.22
Moreover, a duty to be tested would ameliorate some of
the problems created by the latency period of AIDS. With ei-
ther a duty to disclose or abstain, courts must determine what
knowledge gives rise to the duty. However, defendants who
have had an AIDS test will have actual knowledge of the risk
of infecting their partners.223 Since there would be a record of
the defendant's HIV status, the courts would save the adminis-
trative costs of determining whether the defendant "knew" his
HIV status. Furthermore, deserving plaintiffs would be able to
prove causation more easily, which may be extremely difficult
218. See Elber, supra note 4, at 937-38 (noting that a person who honestly believes
he is not infected is not necessarily relieved of the duty of ascertaining his true HIV sta-
tus). See also Alice D. v. William M., 450 N.Y.S.2d 350, 355 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982) (hold-
ing that the defendant was negligent even though he honestly believed he was sterile be-
cause he did not take reasonable care to determine his true status).
219. AIDS testing is a highly reliable way for people to obtain definitive information
about their HIV status. See Moss, supra note 8, at 23 (noting that the false-positive rate
of HIV tests is negligible).
220. Id.
221. See supra part III.E.2.
222. If one is tested for AIDS, one will be aware of one's HIV status. It is also
reasonable to assume that some individuals who learn they are HIV-positive will feel mor-
ally compelled to avoid high-risk sexual contact. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying
text.
223. Although a small number of people may be misled by false test results, this
problem is negligible given the high reliability of AIDS tests. See Moss, supra note 8, at
23. However, there is a window period of six to twelve months after exposure during which
the test results may not show the presence of HIV. See supra notes 45-46 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the latency period).
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in AIDS cases. 24 At least there would be no doubt about the
defendant's ability to infect the plaintiff at the time of the
party's encounter.
An even more substantial benefit of imposing a duty to be
tested is that it would encourage people to ascertain their HIV
status. Since obtaining an AIDS test would prevent liability,
those who are sexually active would have a strong incentive to
be tested. This practice would put those infected on notice that
unprotected sexual contact poses a significant risk to sexual
partners. It is reasonable to assume that some people who learn
they are HIV-positive will feel a compelling moral obligation
not to expose unknowing partners. 2 5
However, HIV will not necessarily be detected until six
months after exposure.2 6 As a result, imposing a duty to be
tested for AIDS has its own shortcomings. First, the duty to be
tested infringes on the right to privacy even more extensively
than the duty to disclose or the duty to use a condom. The
right to privacy is implicated at two levels: (1) the requirement
that a party abstain from sexual intercourse for six to twelve
months until reliable results of an AIDS test can be ob-
tained;227 and (2) the requirement that to engage in private in-
timate relations a potential defendant must submit to an AIDS
test.2 8
The lag time between exposure and a conclusive test result
poses an even more basic problem. The courts must determine
what liability rules to apply during the interim period. Would-
be defendants could be required to abstain from intercourse
during this period. However, requiring abstinence would likely
constitute an overly broad infringement on the right to pri-
224. The problem of proving causation in AIDS cases has been the subject of exten-
sive commentary. See supra note 120 (listing commentators who argue that proving causa-
tion will be difficult in AIDS transmission cases).
225. See generally supra notes 135-37 and accompanying test (discussing the role of
personal moral constraints in discouraging tortious conduct).
226. See Moss, supra note 8, at 24.
227. See Goldberg, supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (noting that a negative
test during the first six months after exposure means only that the person has not developed
HIV antibodies).
228. The New York Supreme Court has explicitly rejected attempts to compel de-
fendants to submit to AIDS tests so that plaintiffs can determine if they are at risk. See
Anne D. v. Raymond D., 528 N.Y.S.2d 775, 778 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (holding that a
wife's involvement in extramarital affairs was insufficient to force her to submit to AIDS
testing).
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vacy."2 9 Here also, the courts may consider the duty to disclose
or to use a condom, a less intrusive invasion of the right to
230privacy.
Alternatively, if an individual is tested before engaging in
sexual activity with a new partner, the courts could permit him
to remain sexually active during the "window period." A de-
fendant who was tested would not be negligent even if his test
results could not be confidently relied on. This approach would
yield some of the benefits that flow from increased HIV test-
ing.231 However, allowing defendants to rely on test results that
may well be invalid creates a serious inequity. A plaintiff would
be barred from receiving compensation even if he has taken
extensive precautions.
Plaintiffs could be protected by combining the duty to be
tested with the duty to disclose that the test results are incon-
clusive. This type of disclosure requirement avoids some
problems of the duty to disclose high-risk or HIV-positive sta-
tus. As noted above, the duty to disclose HIV status is imprac-
tical since most of those infected do not know their HIV sta-
tus. 32 By contrast, the duty to disclose in this context turns on
the defendant's lack of knowledge. Similarly, this approach
does not entail the Equal Protection Clause concerns associated
with a duty to disclose high-risk status.233
However, this hybrid duty would not work within the
traditional venereal disease model. The venereal disease model
rejects the use of affirmative defenses, such as contributory or
comparative negligence or assumption of the risk.2 34 Even if the
defendant discloses that his test result is not conclusive, he
would be subject to the same degree of liability. The venereal
229. See discussion supra at part III.E.2. (discussing the probability that requiring
parties to abstain from sexual intercourse likely would be considered an overly broad inva-
sion of the right to privacy).
230. A requirement that a defendant disclose he has not yet obtained a valid test
result since his last sexual contact also would be less intrusive.
231. See supra notes 220-24 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of in-
creased HIV testing). These benefits would be undermined to some extent because the test
would not necessarily alert the defendant to his actual HIV status.
232. See generally supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (observing that some of
the I to 1.5 million people infected remain asymptomatic).
233. See supra notes 192-202 and accompanying text (analyzing the Equal Protec-
tion Clause concerns associated with imposing a duty to disclose high-risk status).
234. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (analyzing the venereal disease
model's rejection of these affirmative defenses).
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disease model would not reduce the recovery of a plaintiff who
relies on an inconclusive test result. Thus, the defendant has no
incentive to make such a disclosure. While this hybrid ap-
proach has numerous benefits, it does not work if the entire
duty of care is imposed on would-be defendants.
4. Defendant's Duty to Use a Condom
A final standard of care that should be considered is the
duty to use a latex condom during sexual intercourse. This
standard of care makes some sense since latex condoms are ef-
fective barriers against HIV transmission. 3 5 Compliance with
the appropriate standard of care, that is, use of a condom,
would extinguish the defendant's liability even though condoms
may fail to prevent the transmission of the virus because of
misuse or defects.23 6 Thus, plaintiffs who take substantial pre-
cautions to avoid contracting AIDS would be left entirely with-
out a remedy. A more appropriate approach is to apportion a
plaintiff's recovery by balancing the care taken by both
partners.
IV. SOLUTION-SHIFTING THE BURDEN
The venereal disease model imposes the entire duty to
avoid the spread of AIDS on would-be defendants.3 7 A more
efficient and equitable approach is to impose a duty on all sex-
ual partners. The courts should adopt a rule that discourages
both parties from conduct likely to result in substantial expend-
itures in public funds. The courts have generally rejected con-
tributory or comparative negligence and assumption of the risk
theories in sexually transmitted disease cases.233 However, the
huge social costs associated with AIDS dictates that plaintiffs
not be allowed to proceed in "ignorant bliss" when confronted
with the risk of HIV infection.
235. See Peterson, supra note 43, at 446 (discussing the effectiveness of latex con-
doms in preventing transmission of HIV).
236. Id.
237. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' and com-
mentators' rejection of affirmative defenses in venereal disease cases).
238. See id. The courts have been unwilling to recognize these affirmative defenses
because of a hesitancy to conclude that "the risk of contracting a disease must be assumed
when entering a sexual relationship." See Papelian, supra note 4, at 677.
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A duty should be imposed on all persons to inquire about
the sexual history of their partners. Comparative negligence ju-
risdictions should apply this standard to reduce awards to
plaintiffs who do not take adequate precautions to avoid con-
tracting AIDS. In contributory negligence jurisdictions, this
standard should be applied to bar claims when the plaintiff
fails to take adequate precautions. In AIDS cases, comparative
negligence will yield the most equitable and efficient results.
Moreover, contributory negligence will yield more equitable
and efficient results than the venereal disease model. This solu-
tion is aimed at cases where negligence theories are most ap-
propriate-those where the defendant does not "know" his
HIV status. The reason for this limitation is that liability for
"knowingly" or "intentionally" infecting another with AIDS is
more easily established.23  Before exploring the benefits of ap-
plying contributory and comparative negligence in AIDS trans-
mission cases, the reasons for rejecting assumption of the risk
as an alternative will be examined.
A. Assumption of the Risk
A party can expressly or impliedly assume the risk.2 40 Ex-
press assumption of the risk consists of an express agreement
between the parties that the defendant is under no obligation of
care to the plaintiff.241 By contrast, a party impliedly assumes
the risk if fully aware of the risk, the party "freely and volun-
tarily" chooses to confront it.2 42 Under the assumption of the
risk doctrine, a plaintiff who continues in the face of a known
239. When the defendant "knows" he is HIV-positive, his intent to infect his partner
can be inferred from his engaging in sexual relations while knowing he is infected. See
State v. Lankford, 102 A. 63, 64 (Del. 1917) (inferring intent of husband to communicate
syphilis to his wife from the "actual results" of engaging in sexual relations while infected).
Additionally, the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk
do not apply to intentional torts. See generally PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 94, § 65, at
451 (characterizing contributory negligence and assumption of the risk as defenses to negli-
gence actions). If the defendant "knows" he is HIV-positive, causation also will be easier to
establish. Since the defendant was HIV-positive at the time of the sexual contact, the
plaintiff should be able to show that the defendant was capable of infecting the plaintiff.
240. See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 94, § 68, at 482-86 (distinguishing express
assumption of the risk from implied assumption of the risk).
241. Id. at 482.
242. See id. at 485 (stating that "by entering freely and voluntarily into any relation
or situation where the negligence of the defendant is obvious" the plaintiff may be found to
have impliedly assumed the risk of harm). Assumption of the risk results from "knowledge
and acquiescence" to a known risk while contributory negligence consists of conduct that
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risk is barred from recovery no matter how "reasonable" his
conduct.24 3
The express assumption of the risk is not likely to be rele-
vant when the defendant does not "know" he is HIV-positive.
An express assumption of the risk defense could arise if the
plaintiff agrees to sexual relations with the defendant after the
defendant discloses that he is infected.244 If the defendant does
not know his HIV status, however, this disclosure would not be
possible.145 Considering the prevalence of AIDS,2 46 a plaintiff
who engages in sexual relations without knowledge of the de-
fendant's HIV status may be held to have impliedly assumed
the risk. 4 7 The argument in favor of applying assumption of
the risk is even stronger if: (1) the plaintiff never inquires
about the defendant's HIV status,248 or (2) the plaintiff en-
gages in sexual relations with the defendant despite knowledge
of the defendant's high-risk activity. 49
Under this analysis, a plaintiff who engages in sexual rela-
tions without asking about a partner's HIV status and taking
appropriate precautions would be barred from recovery. Gener-
ally, courts have avoided imposing a duty on plaintiffs in vene-
departs from the standard of conduct of a reasonable person. See id. at 482 (distinguishing
assumption of the risk from contributory negligence).
243. See id. at 481 (explaining that a plaintiff cannot be contributorily negligent if
his conduct is reasonable, but he can assume the risk).
244. See Fredrickson, supra note 4, at 981 (explaining the fact pattern that would
have to exist for express assumption of the risk to prevail in an AIDS transmission case).
245. The courts have narrowly construed express assumption of the risk and have
required consent to a specific risk where the nature and scope of that risk are brought
home to the plaintiff. See generally PROSSER ON ToRTs, supra note 94, § 68, at 482-84
(discussing the tendency of the courts to narrowly construe the express assumption of the
risk). Consent to a "general danger" is not generally sufficient for assumption of the risk.
Id. at 486. The courts often require the plaintiff to consent to the specific risk of harm. Id.
at 487. Thus, where the defendant is unaware of his HIV status, it is unlikely that a
plaintiff will have enough information to expressly assume the risk.
246. See discussion supra part II.A. (discussing the scope of the AIDS epidemic).
247. See Brigham, supra note 90, at 549-50 (suggesting that sexual partners could
be found to impliedly assume the risk of consequences resulting from engaging in sexual
activity); Papelian, supra note 4, at 677 (arguing that imposing assumption of the risk on
plaintiffs in HIV transmission cases would curb the spread of AIDS) but noting that the
courts have traditionally been reluctant to apply assumption of the risk in cases involving
the sexual transmission of diseases).
248. See Papelian, supra note 4, at 677 (suggesting that a defendant may use the
assumption of the risk defense if the parties entered into a sexual relationship without
knowledge of each other's HIV status).
249. See Gainor, supra note 165, at 907 (explaining that assumption of the risk
might be successful if the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the defendant's high-risk activ-
ity and engaged in sexual activity with the defendant).
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real disease cases; 250 however, the courts could curb the rising
social costs of AIDS by applying the assumption of the risk
defense.2 51 The social costs of AIDS is already staggering.
25 2
Further, the administrative costs of allowing the courts to be
inundated with AIDS transmission cases may increase substan-
tially these social costs. 253
Assumption of the risk also promotes the deterrence objec-
tives of tort law by imposing a duty on would-be plaintiffs
(uninfected sexual partners). By preventing recovery in AIDS
transmission cases, assumption of the risk increases an unin-
tended partner's cost of engaging in high-risk activities. This
increased cost might deter a would-be plaintiff from engaging
in unsafe conduct, thereby, slowing the spread of AIDS.254 Un-
like the venereal disease model, assumption of the risk, in the-
ory, provides an incentive for all sexual partners to avoid
spreading AIDS rather than only would-be defendants. As a
corollary, social norms against conduct that contribute to the
spread of AIDS are also reinforced.
While assumption of the risk would encourage plaintiffs to
avoid contracting HIV in practice, this defense places the duty
of care entirely on plaintiffs. 255 Assumption of the risk would
250. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' reluctance to
impose such a duty).
251. Cf. SHAVELL, supra note 138, at 28 (explaining that a liability rule reducing
the total cost to a plaintiff of engaging in an activity may encourage plaintiffs to engage in
the activity at a level that exceeds the societal optimum).
252. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text (examining the enormous strain
AIDS has placed on the public health care system).
253. See SSAVELL, supra note 138, at 262-63 (stating that the administrative costs
of litigation are so high that many estimates predict that the costs equal or exceed the
amount received by victims). Since many AIDS victims are likely to be judgment-proof,
the administrative costs to society may substantially exceed the compensation received by
plaintiffs. The court system is already inundated with AIDS cases. See Braden, supra note
3, at 281 (noting that the courts have been faced with a "glut of AIDS-related filings and
will soon be confronted with a staggering number of AIDS cases"). See also Hancock,
supra note 3, at 8 (estimating that over 1500 AIDS-related cases are currently pending).
254. See supra notes 139-47 and accompanying text (explaining that imposing liabil-
ity creates an incentive to take care).
255. The extent to which the assumption of the risk "overshifts" the burden of care
explains why it has fallen out of favor in many jurisdictions. See PROSSER ON ToRTs, supra
note 94, § 68, at 493-96 (discussing the trend of the courts to abolish the defense or absorb
it into the comparative negligence system because it denies recovery to plaintiffs who
should recover). The problem with assumption of the risk is that even when the plaintiff
has taken reasonable steps to avoid contracting HIV, he would not be able to recover
against a "grossly negligent" defendant. See id. at 495 (indicating that a defendant may
assume the risk even where the defendant's conduct is "willful, wanton, or reckless").
Thus, assumption of the risk is a mechanical rule that shifts the burden completely to the
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not allow courts to balance the defendant's degree of culpabil-
ity against that of the plaintiff.256 Ironically, assumption of the
risk merely reverses the distribution of the duty under the vene-
real disease model. The venereal disease model permits plain-
tiffs to engage in repeated high-risk activity without being de-
nied recovery. Conversely, assumption of the risk allows
defendants to engage in repeated high-risk activities without
exposure to liability. Thus, assumption of the risk swings the
duty pendulum too far in the direction of plaintiffs and imposes
no duty on would-be defendants to avoid spreading HIV.2
57
Moreover, assumption of the risk would create inequitable re-
sults because the "virgin plaintiff'"2 5 8 would not recover even
against a reckless defendant. So while assumption of the risk
has some appeal, it rewards reckless conduct likely to contrib-
ute to the spread of AIDS.
B. Contributory Negligence
Contributory negligence is the failure to take the degree of
care an ordinary prudent person would take to protect himself
from an unreasonable risk of harm. 59 Unlike assumption of the
risk, a plaintiff is only contributorily negligent if the costs and
benefits associated with his conduct would lead an ordinary
prudent person to abstain. 2 0 Thus, contributory negligence en-
tails a balancing approach like that used in determining
whether to impose a duty on defendants.28 ' A plaintiff who fails
plaintiff thereby removing any incentive for the defendant to take care. See id. at 494
(discussing the genuine hardships created by assumption of the risk and the defense's effect
of removing the defendant's duty of care). Assumption of the risk also can inadvertently
result in legally protecting the party who is primarily at fault. See id. at 493 (discussing
the tendency of assumption of the risk to deny recovery to a plaintiff who deserves to
recover).
256. See id.
257. See Elber, supra note 4, at 941 (arguing that the assumption of the risk may
contribute to the spread of AIDS by granting immunity to defendants). But see Papelian,
supra note 4, at 677 (contending that plaintiffs should be held to assume the risk to curb
the spread of AIDS because the risk of disease is as great as that of pregnancy).
258. This term is used to refer to a person who has never engaged in any high-risk
activity including sexual contact with a partner exposed to high-risk activity.
259. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1977) (defining contributory
negligence).
260. See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 94, § 65, at 453 (explaining that the con-
tributory negligence standard involves the same reasonable person standard and cost-bene-
fit analysis as ordinary negligence).
261. Id.
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to take the care an ordinary prudent person would take to
avoid an unreasonable risk of harm is completely barred from
recovery.62 Unlike assumption of the risk, contributory negli-
gence would impose a duty on both sexual partners to avoid
spreading HIV.263 Contributory negligence would allow the
"virgin plaintiff" to recover against the "careless defendant." 264
If the plaintiff takes reasonable precaution to avoid spreading
HIV, he is not barred from recovery. 65
By imposing a duty on both partners, contributory negli-
gence promotes a more socially optimal outcome than the
traditional model or assumption of the risk. First, contributory
negligence provides a more appropriate means of reinforcing
social norms against unsafe conduct by imposing a duty on all
sexual partners to take precautions. Contributory negligence
also provides a better means of reinforcing these norms than
assumption of the risk because plaintiffs who take precautions
to avoid HIV are rewarded, and defendants who violate these
norms do not easily escape liability.
Additionally, contributory negligence more effectively pro-
motes corrective justice norms than assumption of the risk. A
plaintiff who has taken reasonable precautions to protect him-
262. Although contributory negligence is less rigid than assumption of the risk be-
cause only unreasonable conduct extinguishes the defendant's liability, contributory negli-
gence, too, has a rigid mechanical impact once the plaintiff falls below the required stan-
dard of care. See generally PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 94, § 67, at 468-69 (discussing
contributory negligence's effect of placing the entire burden of care on the plaintiff even
when both parties are responsible for the harm). At that point, the defendant is relieved
from any duty of care even if his conduct is far more negligent. See id. at 469 (noting that
the plaintiff is denied recovery even though the defendant's negligent conduct may have
played an even greater role in causing the resulting harm). But see id. § 65, at 462 (noting
that recovery is not necessarily barred if the defendant's conduct rises to the level of "wan-
ton" or "willful" negligence).
263. It should be noted that assumption of the risk completely eliminates the defend-
ant's general duty to avoid the unreasonable risk of harm where the plaintiff voluntarily
engages in the potentially harmful activity.
264. This term refers to a defendant who has engaged in intermittent high-risk activ-
ity without taking reasonable precautions to avoid contracting the HIV infection. The term
is not intended to include what might be called "gross negligence" or "recklessness." The
rationale for this limitation is that contributory negligence is not a defense to more aggra-
vated forms of negligence referred to by courts as "willful, wanton, or reckless." See gener-
ally PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 94, § 65, at 462 (outlining the scope of the contribu-
tory negligence defense).
265. The nature of those precautions will be determined by the scope and magnitude
of the risk balanced against the cost of taking care incurred by the plaintiff and society.
See generally id. at § 453-54 (discussing the factors the courts weigh when evaluating the
reasonableness of a plaintiff's conduct).
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self can recover against a careless defendant. In this scenario,
the wrongdoer and not the infected party bears the loss. Cor-
rective justice norms also would be carefully tailored to reward
only those who have taken adequate precautions. This narrow
tailoring is justified since society as a whole bears a dispropor-
tionate amount of the costs associated with the AIDS crisis.
Contributory negligence also promotes deterrence goals
better than the venereal disease model or assumption of the
risk. Contributory negligence does not entirely shift the burden
of care to the plaintiff or defendant. Contributory negligence
promotes deterrence goals by forcing both parties to take rea-
sonable precautions to avoid the spread of AIDS. Thus, plain-
tiffs are not rewarded for conduct likely to spread AIDS, and
defendants must take care not to act recklessly even if the
plaintiff is negligent.
Although contributory negligence resolves the easy case of
the "virgin plaintiff" and the "careless defendant," the defense
has significant shortcomings. First, the defense may not provide
defendants with sufficient incentives to avoid high-risk activ-
ity. 66 Since the plaintiff is completely barred from recovery
once he falls below the required standard of care, the defendant
can be extremely careless and escape liability. 67 Thus, contrib-
utory negligence does not provide enough incentive to discour-
age conduct likely to spread AIDS.
Moreover, a plaintiff may fail to inquire about the defend-
ant's HIV status. The defendant could then engage in careless
(though not reckless) conduct with immunity. This scenario is
significant because contributory negligence requires setting an
appropriate standard of care. The minimum conceivable stan-
dard of care would require plaintiffs to ask about their part-
ners' HIV status.2 68 If a plaintiff does not even attempt to as-
266. If the plaintiff is contributorily negligent, the defendant is immune from liabil-
ity absent "wanton, willful, or reckless" conduct. See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 94,
§ 65, at 462. Thus, once the plaintiff has been negligent, the defendant has no incentive to
take care. For example, a court may find a plaintiff who does not inquire about the HIV
status of his partner contributorily negligent. The defendant could then engage in sexual
relations without taking precautions such as using a condom or discussing his sexual
history.
267. Id.
268. The duty to inquire about a partner's HIV status would seem to be the least
intrusive burden that could be imposed on the plaintiff. See Brigham, supra note 90, at 545
(characterizing the duty to say "I have AIDS" as a minimal burden on defendants in
AIDS transmission cases).
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certain a partner's HIV status, the plaintiff's argument that he
has taken minimum precautions to protect himself is uncon-
vincing; however, the duty to ask about a partner's HIV status
has a serious weakness as the standard of care. This standard
of care would effectively shift the entire duty to the plaintiff. A
plaintiff would be expected to inquire about the HIV status of
a partner before engaging in sexual relations. If the plaintiff
fails to ask about a partner's HIV status, the partner is relieved
of the duty to take precautions. 6 9 Viewed another way, if the
plaintiff never inquires about his partner's HIV status, the de-
fendant's duty is never triggered. Thus, while contributory neg-
ligence is superior both to the venereal disease model and as-
sumption of the risk, this defense also fails to equitably allocate
the burden of avoiding AIDS or to adequately promote tort
objectives.
C. Comparative Negligence
Comparative negligence provides the most efficient rule
because it entails balancing both the defendant's and plaintiff's
conduct. Since the plaintiff is not entirely barred from recovery
even if his own negligence contributes to his injury,270 the
plaintiff does not bear the entire loss if the defendant has sub-
stantially contributed to the injury.2  Instead of barring the
plaintiff's claim entirely, the plaintiff's recovery is reduced in
proportion to his own contribution to his injury.272
The majority of jurisdictions have shifted to this doc-
trine. 73 Two benefits of comparative negligence may explain
the doctrine's growing popularity. First, comparative negli-
gence ameliorates the hardships associated with shifting the en-
tire burden to the plaintiff in the first instance. 4 Under this
269. This is modified by the caveat noted above that contributory negligence is not a
defense to more aggravated forms of negligence like "recklessness." See generally supra
note 265 and accompanying text (discussing the factors the courts weigh when evaluating
the reasonableness of a plaintiff's conduct).
270. See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 94, § 67, at 472 (explaining that "pure"
comparative negligence reduces recovery in proportion to the fault of the plaintiff).
271. See id. at 468-69 (discussing the hardship created if the plaintiff bears the en-
tire loss when the defendant is far more at fault).
272. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
273. See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 94, § 67, at 471 (observing that over 40
states have already switched to comparative negligence by legislative or court action).
274. See id. at 468-69 (discussing the widespread view that contributory negligence
unfairly imposes the entire loss on the plaintiff when both parties are responsible).
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doctrine, the plaintiff's negligence does not give the defendant
immunity to engage in unsafe conduct.27 Second, comparative
negligence produces economically optimal outcomes.2 7 Because
liability is assigned according to fault, both parties are forced
to internalize the costs of their high-risk conduct. Theoretically,
because the parties internalize these costs, neither over- or
under-deterrence of the parties' conduct occurs.27 Thus, de-
fendants will continue risky behavior only until the resulting
damage award no longer makes continuing the behavior worth
the costs. Similarly, plaintiffs will engage in high-risk conduct
only if the benefits offset a potential reduction in recovery.
Comparative negligence provides several additional bene-
fits. First, this doctrine provides the most equitable distribution
of the duty of care in AIDS cases.2 78 All sexual partners can
take precautions that are equally effective in avoiding spread-
ing AIDS.2 79 Thus, recovery should be apportioned according
to the degree of care taken by each of the parties.
Unlike contributory negligence and assumption of the risk,
comparative negligence is not a rigid mechanical rule. A minor
breach in the appropriate standard of care by a plaintiff does
not cut off liability if the defendant is more at fault. Thus, a
defendant is not rewarded for unsafe conduct, such as not
wearing a condom, if the plaintiff fails to inquire about the de-
fendant's HIV status.
Comparative negligence effectively reinforces social norms
against unsafe conduct likely to spread AIDS. Comparative
negligence's balancing approach directly apportions liability ac-
cording to the parties' conformance with social norms against
high-risk conduct. Comparative negligence also ideally serves
corrective justice goals by directly adjusting the level of recov-
ery according to the degree of fault.
275. See generally id. at 470-71 (describing comparative negligence as a system that
apportions damages between the parties according to their degree of fault).
276. See SHAVELL, supra note 138, at 40 (noting that the defense of comparative
negligence will yield optimal results because both parties will take the most efficient level
of care).
277. See Sugarman, supra note 112, at 613-15 (explaining that the internalization of
cost is believed to force the proper "activity level" by both parties).
278. Cf. Goldberg, supra note 45, at 90 (contending that because most people know
about the risk of AIDS and how to avoid contracting AIDS, both sexual partners should
take precautions).
279. See id.
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Comparative negligence also provides the optimal rule for
deterring conduct likely to spread AIDS. Again, recovery is di-
rectly tied to the degree of care taken by the parties to avoid
the spread of HIV. Measures taken to reduce the spread of
AIDS will yield proportional reductions in damage awards.
Thus, there is no disincentive to avoid further precautions once
a certain level of care is met.2 10 Theoretically, both parties will
take additional precautions until their marginal utility from ad-
ditional precautions does not exceed the costs of the precaution.
Additionally, careless plaintiffs will be discouraged from bring-
ing suits with the substantial transaction costs associated with
the tort system.28 l Yet incentives designed to deter more dan-
gerous conduct by defendants would not be diluted.
If the minimum duty to avoid comparative negligence is
the duty to inquire about high-risk conduct, then an optimal
allocation of duty occurs. First, if a plaintiff does not inquire
about a potential partner's high-risk conduct, his degree of
fault might be so substantial that recovery would be barred;
however, the courts could still grant reduced recovery against
extremely careless defendants or if the plaintiff takes other pre-
cautions to protect himself, such as using a condom.
Some plaintiffs may ask about the HIV status or sexual
history of their partner, yet proceed in the face of an obvious
risk. These plaintiffs would be barred unless their conduct was
reasonable considering the defendants' disclosure. For example,
a defendant might disclose he did not know his HIV status but
had engaged in sexual relations with several other partners.
Given this disclosure, a plaintiff who engaged in sexual rela-
tions while using a condom should not be barred from recovery.
The plaintiff would be rewarded for both inquiring about the
sexual history of his partner and taking reasonable precautions
based on that disclosure. Further, the defendant would be pe-
nalized for not taking any precautions.
This approach also would allow a more appropriate non-
discriminatory use of "high-risk status." A would-be defendant
might disclose he is a member of a high-risk group. If a plain-
280. See generally Latin, supra note 112, at 708 (noting that "legal doctrines must
ensure that the creation of risk avoidance incentives for one type of party does not dilute
incentives for the other party").
281. See id. at 733 (explaining that the huge expense of the tort system is only
warranted if liability achieves some corresponding increase in social utility).
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tiff possessed such information, he might reasonably be ex-
pected to ask a partner about actual high-risk activity. Thus,
no undue burden is placed on particular demographic groups
simply because of their high-risk status. Both high-risk and
non-high-risk groups would be expected to disclose only high-
risk conduct. The only duty created by high-risk "status"
would actually be imposed on the partner who is not a member
of a high-risk group.
Finally, comparative negligence provides the best approach
to balancing the conflicting values of privacy and trust and con-
fidence in intimate relationships. Any creation of a duty in
AIDS cases will entail some intrusion into the protected realm
of intimate sexual relations. Because comparative negligence is
less mechanical, the doctrine allows the parties to shape the
nature of that intrusion. The only burden the state imposes on
the right to privacy is the burden of acting reasonably toward
one another. The parties themselves are permitted to structure
their activities to meet this general standard. Admittedly, this
approach may require would-be plaintiffs to assume that a po-
tential partner may be infected with HIV. While the extent
that litigants can rely on their partners to protect them from
AIDS will be reduced, the high social costs of HIV infection
justifies requiring a plaintiff to do more than merely assume a
partner is HIV negative.
V. CONCLUSION
AIDS is an incurable fatal disease that is spreading at an
epidemic rate. This epidemic already poses a significant drain
on public health care funds. This financial crisis will only grow
as the 1 to 1.5 million Americans who are currently infected
with HIV, but may be asymptomatic, develop full-blown
AIDS. Slowing the spread of AIDS must remain a national
priority.
The tort system should be utilized to help curb this epi-
demic. In the past, the tort system has been used to deter the
spread of other sexually transmitted diseases. The courts have
been able to foster trust and confidence in intimate sexual rela-
tionships by rejecting affirmative defenses like contributory or
comparative negligence and assumption of the risk. Promoting
trust and confidence in intimate relationships has been viewed
as more important than the slight marginal gain in deterrence
[Vol. 5:397
IT TAKES TWO TO TANGO
that might be reached by imposing a duty on both parties to a
sexual relationship.
The costs associated with AIDS are far more substantial.
Because AIDS is fatal and leaves most of those afflicted desti-
tute, the traditional approach falls short in the AIDS context.
Would-be defendants will generally be dependent on public
funds. Neither the tort system's compensation nor deterrence
goals are served by only imposing a duty on would-be defend-
ants. Further, because of the extensive social cost of AIDS,
slowing its spread justifies requiring all sexual partners to take
adequate precautions to avoid infection.
Contributory and comparative negligence provide an in-
centive to all sexual partners to take precautions to avoid
spreading AIDS. The AIDS crisis has become too serious to
merely allow would-be plaintiffs to proceed in "ignorant bliss,"
because it is the public that will ultimately bear the cost of
health care and litigation.
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